An agent authorized to collect rent on behalf of the landlord cannot file a release application for personal need or for family members under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, as the agent is not the owner of the premises in question.

Tarun Agarwala, J.—The landlord-respondent filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 praying for the release of the premises in question for her personal need and for the members of her family. The landlord alleged that she has three sons out of which one of them has been married and other two sons were also of marriageable age and, therefore, requires the additional accommodation in order to give privacy and space to her children. The landlord pleaded that she has only two rooms, one store and two verandah in her possession, which were insufficient for her requirement.

2. The release application was contested by the petitioners, who contended that the release application was not bona fide and was mala fide and that the accommodation in possession of the landlady was more than sufficient and that the remaining two sons were not likely to get married and, therefore, she does not require additional accommodation. The petitioners further contended that respondent No. 3 was only a landlord for the purposes of collecting the rent and that she was not the owner of the premises in question. The petitioners contended that the owner and landlord of the building in dispute was one Shabbir Hussain. After his death his sons Mahmood Hussain, Asgar Hussain, Masood Hussain and Jaheer Hussain became the sole owner and co-landlords and that they have migrated to Pakistan. The petitioners contended that the property has not been transferred or mutated in favour of respondent No. 3. At another place in the written statement the petitioners contended that respondent No. 3 was only an agent of the original landlord and that she was not the owner and, therefore, could not file an application for release of the premises for her own need.

3. The trial court after considering the evidence on record held that the landlord’s need was bona fide and that she required the premises for her children. The Prescribed Authority also came to the conclusion that the landlord would suffer greater hardship than the petitioners, in the event the premises was not released. The prescribed authority further held that respondent No. 3 was the owner and landlord of the premises in question and that her application for release was maintainable. The prescribed authority, accordingly, allowed the release application and directed the petitioners to vacate the premises in question. Aggrieved by the order of the prescribed authority the petitioners filed an appeal, which was also dismissed.

4. Aggrieved the petitioners have now filed the present writ petition.

5. Heard Sri M. A. Qadeer, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, the learned counsel holding the brief of Sri R. K. Awasthi, for the respondent.

6. It may be stated here that before the appellate court the petitioners had moved an amendment application praying for amendment of certain paragraphs of their written statement whereby the petitioners sought to withdraw certain admissions made by them, namely, that respondent No. 3 was not the landlord and that she was only authorised to collect the rent on behalf of the original landlord. This application was rejected by the appellate authority, against which the petitioners filed a writ petition before this Court which was also dismissed by order dated 19.8.1988 holding that it was open to the petitioners to challenge the said order after the final orders in the appeal are passed.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the petitioners had categorically alleged and contended that respondent No. 3 was not the owner or landlord of the premises in question and that at best she was only authorized to collect the rent on behalf of the original landlord. The learned counsel submitted that since respondent No. 3 was only authorized to collect the rent, she could not file an application for the release of the premises for her own need and that an application for the release of the building could onl