The judgment established the principle that 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice and that the appellant needed to explain the delay after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation.

Sanjay Misra, J.—By means of this instant appeal, the appellants have challenged the judgment and order dated 4.3.1989 passed by the Ist Additional District Judge, Ghazipur in Misc. Case No. 9 of 1988 Arising out of Civil Appeal No. 339 of 1987, Ram Briksh Singh v. Amjad. An interim order dated 2.5.1989 was passed by this Court when this appeal was admitted.

2. By the impugned order, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed along with restoration application has been rejected by the court below. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the appeal of the appellant was dismissed for default with costs on 1.7.1988. The application for restoration along with Section 5 application supported with affidavit was made by the appellant on 4.8.1988. Consequently there was delay of four days in making the application. A copy of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act supporting affidavit dated 4.8.1988 has been filed as Annexures-1 and 2 in this appeal along with stay application. A perusal of the aforesaid affidavit indicates that the appellant was taken suddenly ill on 1.7.1988 due to which he could not be present when the appeal was called out.

3. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appellant had stated that the appellant No. 3 is in service outside. The appellant No. 2 is an illiterate person and does not do pairvi of the appeal. The appellant No. 1 is teacher in Jangipur Inter College. It has further been stated that after 1.7.1988, when the appellant recovered from his ailment he went to the Court but found that the Court employees were on strike and the work of the Court had been paralyzed. The appellant states that when he came to know that the strike of the Court employees has been called off, he applied for leave from his college and came to the Court on 4.8.1988 and filed the application for restoration as well as under Section 5 Limitation Act.

4. The appellant has filed copy of the objection made by the plaintiff respondent contained as Annexures-3 and 4 to the affidavit supporting stay application. A perusal of the objection made by the plaintiff respondent indicates that the illness of the appellant has been denied on the ground that there was no medical certificate filed by the appellant. It has further been said in the objection that the appellant works in Virno Block and comes back home every day. It has also been said in the objection that the appeal of the appellant was dismissed earlier and this was the second time that the appeal was dismissed in default on 1.7.1988, as such the application of the appellant under Section 5 Limitation Act and the restoration deserves to be rejected.

5. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the court below has rejected the condonation of delay application on the ground that the civil court employees started their strike on 11.7.1988 and the appellant knew very well that his appeal was fixed for hearing on 1.7.1988. The court below observes that after the appellant recovers from sickness, he could turn up in the Court three to four days after the date fixed. The Court observes that the appellant turned up in the Court during continuance of strike of civil court employees. Further the Court observes that there is no medical certificate to prove that the appellant was sick on 1.7.1988, therefore, the Court has concluded that the appellant very well knew about the dismissal of his appeal before the strike was started hence the reason given by the appellant that he recovered when the strike started is not acceptable. The Court has further stated in its order that there is no proof that the appellant was busy in connection with admission of students in the school. There is no copy of application for taking leave from the school. There is no affidavit of employee of the school to show that the appellant was in fact busy in connection with admission and that he had applied for leave but leave was refused. The Court has c