Hon’ble Shri Kant Tripathi, J.—Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and the learned AGA and also perused the record.

2. This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings of Complaint Case Nos. 2356 of 2003 (Vipin Kumar v. Yogendra) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, P.S. Kotwali, District Jaunpur pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur.

3. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 was not maintainable. It was further submitted that the respondent No. 2 on receiving the information that the cheque tendered by him to the Bank had been dishonoured for want of adequate fund in the account of respondent No. 2, sent the legal notice to the applicant on 26.11.2002 by registered post, which was properly served on the applicant but respondent No. 2 did not file any complaint within the statutory period. The respondent No. 2 served a second notice dated 1.5.2003 on the applicant by registered post and on the basis of that notice, he has filed the present complaint case. The learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that it was open to the respondent No. 2 to file a complaint on the basis of the first notice within the stipulated period but when he failed to file the same within the stipulated period after the service of the first notice, he had no authority to file the complaint by serving the second notice.

4. The learned AGA on the other hand submitted that the respondent No. 2, after service of the first notice on the applicant tendered the cheque in the Bank on 7.4.2003 and the Bank again informed him on 25.4.2003 that the amount was not payable for want of adequate fund, therefore, the second notice was valid.

5. The Apex Court has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhvan Sunil Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 514 and propounded the relevant principles of law in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment, which are being reproduced below:

“6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action” means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act.

(a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured;

(b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period;

(c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and

(d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

If we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term ‘cause of action’ certainly each of the above fact would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two Sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises-can arise - only once.

7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause o