Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. No purpose would be served by keeping this writ petition pending and by calling for further affidavits specifically in view of the order proposed to be passed today by this Court.

3. Petitioner before this Court has raised certain constructions within the territorial jurisdiction of Muzaffarnagar Development Authority. These constructions, according to the Development Authority, were illegal and, therefore, proceedings were initiated under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The petitioner made an application for compounding. This compounding application was allowed and a demand of Rs. 22,16,640/- was raised.

4. According to the petitioner, the demand of the compounding fee to the extent indicated above was excessive. He was advised to file an appeal under Section 27(2) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner, Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur who is the Chairman of the Development Authority vide order dated 25.8.2011 on the ground that an appeal under Section 27(2) of the Act is not maintainable against the demand of compounding fee. The petitioner thereafter approached the State Government under Section 41(3) of the Act. The State Government under the order impugned dated 12.12.2011 had dismissed the revision-petition on the ground that the same is not maintainable.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 27(2) may not be strictly maintainable but the State Government is not justified in recording a finding that the revision-petition under Section 41(3) was not maintainable against the demand of excessing compounding fee.

6. It is contended that the language of Section 41(3) confers a power upon the State Government to satisfy itself either suo-moto or an application that the order passed by the Authority i.e. the Development Authority or its Chairman is legal and as per the statutory provisions and to issue such directions on application filed under Section 41(3) as the State Government may deem fit. It is contended that in view of the scope of Section 41(3), the order of the Development Authority raising an exorbitant demand of compounding fee, to the tune of Rs. 22,16,640/- could be examined by the State Government and appropriate directions could have been issued. The order passed by the Vice-Chairman of the Development Authority is to be treated to be an order of the Development Authority itself inasmuch as the Authority acts through its Vice-Chairman.

7. Learned Counsel for the Development Authority could not dispute the correctness of the contention raised nor the Standing Counsel could submit before the Court otherwise.

8. I have heard counsel for the parties and have examined the record.

9. It would be worthwhile to reproduce Section 41(3) of the Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 which reads as follows:

41. Control by State Government.—(3) The State Government may, at any time, either on its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by the [Authority, the Chairman or Vice-Chairman] for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit:

Provided that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

From a simple reading of Section 41(3), it is apparently clear that a wide power has been conferred upon the State Government to act suo-moto or an application by a person and to call for the records for satisfying itself with regard to legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued by the Development Authority or its Chairman. The State Government has been conferred a power to issue such