Hon’ble Rajes Kumar, J.—In the present appeal, the appellant is challenging the order dated 19.1.2012 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kairana, Muzaffarnagar, by which Civil Appeal No. 101 of 2011 filed by the appellant and appeal No. 98 of 2011 filed by Kareshan have been dismissed and the order of the trial Court dated 17.8.2011 has been affirmed.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 entered into an agreement to sell dated 21.7.2004 in respect of property in dispute. The respondent No. 2 filed suit No. 201 of 2004 for the cancellation of agreement to sell. The respondent No. 1 filed suit No. 35 of 2005 for specific performance. It appears that during the pendency of the aforesaid suits, the respondent No. 2 has executed the sale-deed of the property in dispute on 17.2.2006 in favour of the appellant. By impleadment application, the appellant has been impleaded as defendant No. 2. Both the suits have been connected and decided by order dated 17.8.2011. The suit No. 35 of 2005 filed by respondent No. 1 has been decreed and suit No. 201 of 2004 filed by the respondent No. 2 for the cancellation of agreement to sell has been dismissed. Against the order of the trial Court, the appellant as well as Kareshan filed the appeals, which have been dismissed by the impugned order. Hence the present appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that during the pendency of the appeals, both the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 colluded and the respondent No. 2 filed the compromise application. The appellate authority has decided the appeals on the basis of the aforesaid compromise and also on merit. He submitted that under Section 16 (c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 the specific performance of contract cannot be entered in favour of the person if he fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform essential terms of the contract, which are to be performed by him. Order VI Rule 3 provides the form of pleadings in Appendix “A”. Appendix “A” Form No. 47 is form for specific performance.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the case of Ram Singh and others v. Sughar Singh, 2010 (6) AWC 6331, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that plaintiff has to plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. Pleading only readiness is not a compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 16 (c). The willingness is necessary to be pleaded. In the absence of such pleading, the suit for specific performance cannot be decreed.

5. He further submitted that the burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove his case and in the present case the plaintiff failed to prove his case. There is no pleading of willingness in the plaint.

6. I do not find any substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant.

7. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read as follows:

“16. Personal bars to relief:

(a) ........

(b) ........

(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.”

8. Section 16 (c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishnasetty, JT 1995 (5) SC 642. The Apex Court held as follows:

“So whole gamut of issue raised is, how to construe a plea specially with reference to Section 16(c) and what are the obligations which the plaintiff has to comply with reference to his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed to conform to the requirement of the aforesaid Section, or does this section require specific words to be pleaded that he has performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract. In construing a plea in any pleading, Courts must keep in mind that a plea is