Hon’ble Manoj Misra, J.—I have heard learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. By this revision, the revisionist has challenged the order dated 23.2.2012 passed by the Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Varanasi, whereby the Court below found sufficient material on record to frame charge against the revisionist, under Sections 7/8 /12 and Sections 13(1) (d) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3. The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the sanction order dated 16.12.2009 records satisfaction only with respect to commission of offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, therefore, charge could not have been framed under Sections 7/8/12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as there was no sanction with respect to those provisions, as is mandatory under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

4. Per contra, learned AGA submitted that if the Sanction Order dated 16.12.2009 is read as a whole it would indicate that sanction was accorded for the prosecution of the person accused with respect to all the offences which gave rise to Case Crime No. 617 of 2008. It was further contended that statement in the sanction order that offence punishable under Sections 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of the Corruption Act is disclosed, is nothing but superfluous and it would not limit the sanction to those provisions only. It has been contended that if the sanction order is read as a whole it would disclose that sanction is not limited to prosecution under Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, but it extends to all the offences, which were registered as Case Crime No. 617 of 2008.

5. Before examining the respective strength of the rival submissions, it would be useful to examine the law laid by the Apex Court with regards to the manner in which a sanction order is to be interpreted particularly when it is not well drafted. The Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, had the occasion to test the validity of a sanction order with regard to the offences punishable under the POTA. There, in paragraph 14 of the judgment, the apex Court observed, as follows:

“The careless and inept drafting of the sanction order has given scope for some of these comments. Surprisingly, in the first para of the order containing recital as to the prima facie satisfaction of the Lieutenant Governor the POTA offences are not specifically mentioned. They are however embraced within the residuary terminology “alongwith other offences”. Instead of mentioning the POTA offences specifically and conspicuously in the order passed under Section 50 of POTA, the drafter reversed that process by mentioning the POTA offences under the residuary expression “apart from other offences”. However, in our view, this careless drafting cannot deal a fatal blow to the sanction order. Looking at the substance and reading the entirety of the order, we come to the irresistible conclusion that sanction was duly given for the prosecution of the accused for the offences under POTA after the competent authority (the Lieutenant Governor) had reached the satisfaction prima facie in regard to the commission of the POTA offences as well.”

Further, in para 15 of the judgment, the Apex Court, observed, as follows:

“....A meticulous and legalistic examination as to the offences applicable and not applicable is not what is expected at the stage of granting sanction. It was observed by the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. R, AIR 1948 PC 82, that: “The charge need not follow the exact terms of the sanction, though it must not relate to an offence essentially different from that to which the sanction relates.”

In any case we do not think that the mention of an inapplicable section goes to the root of the matter or otherwise makes it