ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
H. N. Set, J.
G. B. SINGH
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Writ Petn. No. 3932 of 1972,
Decided On : October 6, 1972
AIR FORCE ACT - SECTION 120 - CONVICTION AND ACQUITTAL - RETRIAL - JURISDICTION - SECOND COURT MARTIAL - VALIDITY OF FINDINGS AND SENTENCE - CONFIRMATION BY CONFIRMING AUTHORITY - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 120 - SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - DISTINCTION BETWEEN VALIDITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FINDINGS AND SENTENCE - POWER OF CONFIRMING AUTHORITY - ANNULMENT OF PROCEEDINGS - SECTION 162 - DISTINGUISHED FROM NON-CONFIRMATION - EFFECT ON RETRIAL - LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RETRIAL AFTER NON-CONFIRMATION OF FINDINGS AND SENTENCE.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner, an Air Force officer, was tried by a General Court Martial and convicted on five charges, but acquitted on the remaining five. The findings and sentence were not confirmed by the Chief of Air Staff, and the petitioner was informed that a fresh General Court Martial was being convened to retry him. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the respondents to convene a second Court Martial, arguing that Section 120 of the Air Force Act barred such a trial.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the proposed trial of the petitioner by the second court-martial was without jurisdiction. The Court interpreted Section 120 of the Air Force Act to mean that a finding or sentence passed by a court-martial exists but cannot be put into effect unless it has been confirmed under the provisions of the Act. Non-confirmation of the findings and sentence does not mean that they are wiped out of existence or cease to exist. Therefore, even if a finding of conviction recorded by a court-martial is not confirmed, it does not affect the fact that the accused has been tried and convicted by a court martial. In such a case, Section 120 of the Act will fully apply and bar a retrial of the accused by another court-martial.
Issues: 1. Whether the respondents had jurisdiction to convene a second General Court Martial for the retrial of the petitioner. 2. Whether Section 120 of the Air Force Act barred such a trial.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the expression "has been convicted or acquitted of an offence by a Court martial", as used in Section 120 of the Act, means that a person is said to be convicted by a Court martial where it finds him guilty and acquitted where it finds him not guilty. 2. The Court held that the expression "no finding of sentence of a general, district or summary general court-martial, shall be valid unless confirmed as provided by the Act" used in Section 120(152 ?) of the Act can either mean that a finding or sentence passed by the Court-martial comes into existence only when it is confirmed by the confirming authority, or that the finding or sentence passed by the court-martial exists but it cannot be put into effect unless it has been confirmed under the provisions of the Act. The Court held that the expression has been used in the second of the two senses.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings pending against the petitioner before the court-martial which had been convened at Nagpur for trying him in respect of the offences alleged to have been committed by him at Kanpur.
By this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, San. Ldr. G. B. Singh seeks a direction that the respondents be asked not to convene a second General Court Martial for his trial on any of the ten charges for which he had already been tried by a general Court Martial on August 1, 1971 and subsequent days.
2. During the period September 1968 to October, 1970 the petitioner was posted as Recruiting Officer at the Air-force Station Kanpur. On August 3, 1971 he was served with a charge sheet in which as many as ten charges were levelled against him. These charges related to his duties as Recruiting Officer at the Air Force Station Kanpur. Subsequently a General Court Martial was convened by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Maintenance Command Nagpur for trying the petitioner. This Court Martial found the petitioner guilty on first five count but acquitted him of the remaining five charges. The petitioner was sentenced to be dismissed from service. In usual course the finding and sentence awarded against the petitioner were referred to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Maintenance Command for confirmation as required by Section 152 of the Air Force Act. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief however, passed an order reserving the same for confirmation by superior authority and forwarded the proceedings to the Chief of the Air Staff. On 10th December 1971 Chief in Air Staff passed an order not confirming the findings of sentence awarded by the court Martial. The findings and sentence which were not confirmed by the Chief in Air Staff together with the order of Chief of Air Staff were promulgated to the petitioner on 17th of January, 1972, as required by rule 78 of the Air Force Rules, 1969.
3. After a lapse of about ten months, the petitioner was informed by the Headquarters Maintenance Command that a fresh General Court Martial was being convened to retry him. He then sought clarification as to how and in what circumstances he was going to be tried afresh. By a communication dated June 13, 1972 the petitioner was informed that the findings and sentence of the General Court Martial had not been confirmed as it was found that the proceedings were not in order. Thus, there was no valid order of the Court Martial convicting or acquitting him. Since needs of justice and discipline demanded that he should be retried, the retrial had been ordered under the provisions of Air Force Act, 1950, in particular in the light of the provisions of Section 152 of the Act. The petitioner contends that once he has been convicted and sentenced by a court martial the respondents have no jurisdiction to convene a second General Court Martial for his retrial. He pleads that Section 120 of the Air Force Act, bars such a trial and therefore a writ of Mandamus be issued to the respondents directing them not to convene the second General Court Martial.
4. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this petition. They contend that the second Court martial is being convened under the orders of the Air Officer Commanding in Chief Maintenance Command, who is stationed at Nagpur outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This Court Martial has been convened at Nagpur. Under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court cannot issue a writ to an authority situated outside its territorial jurisdiction.
5. Article 226(1-A) of the Constitution of India clearly empowers the High Court to issue a writ against any Government Authority or persons situated or residing outside its territorial jurisdiction provided a part of the cause of action, for the relief claimed, arises within its territorial jurisdiction. Main question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether in this case any part of the cause of action, for the relief claimed by the petitioner has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is now, well settled that the expression "cause of action" means every fact which if traversed, it would be
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