Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Supplementary affidavit filed today, is taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Rakesh Pandey alongwith Sri Rishi Kant Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri K.R. Sirohi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Yogesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and Sri R.D.Singh, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 6 to 9.

3. Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4.10.2012 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur in Revision No. 1210 (Naresh v. Mukhram), Revision No. 1297 (Mukhram v. Prabhu) and Revision No. 1298 (Surendra v. Prabhu).

4. Sri Rakesh Pandey alongwith Sri Rishi Kant Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Revisions No. 1297 and 1298 were barred by time and there were also applications for condonation of delay but without issuing notice and without condoning the delay, revisions have been entertained and impugned order has been passed. In the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners, unless the delay is condoned, there could be no revision and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in allowing the revisions.

5. On a specific query made by the Court, from the learned counsel for the respondents, as to whether the submission of Sri Pandey is correct or incorrect, it has been stated that it appears, delay has not been condoned and the revision has been allowed.

6. The counsel for both the parties agreed for disposal of the writ petition, without any further exchange of affidavits, only on the basis of legal points involved in this case.

7. For appreciating the controversy involved in this case, it has to be seen as to whether, without condoning the delay, the revision could be allowed. Section 53 (b) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) which was brought in the Statute vide U.P. Act No. 38 of 1958, provides that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the applications, appeals, revisions and other proceedings under the Act or the Rules made thereunder.

8. Here in this case, the revisions were accompanied with applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for extending the period of limitation in preferring the revisions. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides bar of limitation subject to provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Meaning thereby, if the limitation has been provided for approaching the Court and that period has expired, in that circumstance, Section 5 of the Limitation Act will to rescue of those who approaches the Court after expiry of the period of limitation, by making an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for extending the period of limitation or to condone the delay in approaching the Court. Once an application is filed for condonation of delay extending the period of limitation, then general principles has to be followed in consonance with the provisions contained under Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein it is provided that if the appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation, then it has to be accompanied with an application for condonation of delay and the Court dealing with such matter can reject the application if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and in case the Court finds that there is some substance, then, in that eventuality, notice has to be issued to otherside for having his version for disposal of Section 5 application and in no case, without issuing notice and without condoning the delay, the appeal can be decided. Although, in the Act, the provisions of Order 41, Rule 3-A of C.P.C. are not made applicable but I am of the view that the same analogy should be adopted here also.

9. Here in this case, admittedly, th