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1952 Supreme(All) 277

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHBAD
V. BHARGAVA, CHATURVEDI, JJ.
Maseh Ullah Shah
Versus
Abdul Rehman Sufi
Writ Appln. No.7790 of 1951
Decided On : 05-11-1952

Advocates:
P.M. Verma for Applicant; Jagdish Swamp, Junior Standing Counsel, for the State.

Headnote:

QUO-WARRANTO - NOMINATION OF MEMBER OF MUNICIPAL BOARD - VALIDITY - PROHIBITION - U.P. MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 1916, S. 9.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner challenged the nomination of opposite party 1 as a member of the Municipal Board of Etah by the State Government under S. 9 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, alleging that he was a candidate at the previous general election and had failed to get elected, which was in contravention of the proviso to S. 9.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the nomination of opposite party 1 was invalid as it was in contravention of the proviso to S. 9 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which prohibited the nomination of a person who had stood as a candidate at the previous general election and had not been elected.

Issues: 1. Whether a private individual can move a Court for a writ in the nature of quo-warranto? 2. Whether the membership of a Municipal Board is an office in respect of which a writ of quo warranto can be issued? 3. Whether the discretion to issue a writ of quo warranto should be exercised when there is an adequate alternative remedy, the remedy is being sought at a late stage, and there is a likelihood of a fresh general election in the near future?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that a private individual can move a Court for a writ in the nature of quo-warranto, as the procedure in England, where the writ originated, had evolved to allow private individuals to make such applications. 2. The Court held that the membership of a Municipal Board is an office in respect of which a writ of quo warranto can be issued, as the U.P. Municipalities Act itself declared membership to be an office. 3. The Court held that the existence of an alternative specific remedy or the delay in moving the Court may be adequate grounds for refusing a writ of quo warranto, but in the present case, the writ should be issued as the opposite party 1 was wrongly exercising the powers of the membership of the Board which office he was not entitled to hold.

Final Decision: The Court allowed the application, made the rule absolute, and directed opposite party 1 not to exercise or use the rights, liberties, and privileges in respect of the office of a member of the Municipal Board of Etah. The petitioner was entitled to his costs from opposite party 1.

Judgement

BHARGAVA, J. :- This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of Quo-warranto filed by one Masih Ullah Shah, a resident of the Municipal town of Etah directed against one Abdul Rehman Sufi, opposite-party 1, who was nominated as a member of the Municipal Board of Etah by the State Government some time about the end of the year 1950. There are further prayers for issue of direction or order or a writ in the nature of mandamus or prohibition directing opposite-party 3, the State of Uttar Pradesh, to remove opposite-party 1 from membership of the Municipal Board and to restrain opposite-party 1 from acting as a member of the Board and further directing opposite-party 2, the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Etah, not to recognise opposite party 1 as a member of the Board.

2. When this case came for hearing before us after service or notices on the opposite-parties, learned counsel for opposite parties 1 and 3 raised a preliminary objection that this application for the issue of a writ of quo-warranto could not be entertained by this Court at the instance of the petitioner, Masih Ullah Shah. Learned counsel argued that as the procedure for presentation of application for the issue of a writ of quo-warranto in the High Courts in India has not been prescribed by the Constitution, the procedure that applied in England should be taken into account. His contention was that historically the writ of quo-warranto was originally issued by the king himself and later, when Courts could issue directions, for laying an information in the nature of quo-warranto, this could only be done if the Courts were moved either by the Attorney General or by the Coroner. He also referred to section IV of 9 Anne C20 (1710) to show that, even after that statute had been passed, a private relater could only file information before the appropriate officer of the Court and the information in the nature of quo-warranto could be exhibited only by that officer of the Court with the leave of the Court. On this ground, he contended that a private individual cannot move a Court for a writ in the nature of quo-warranto and that the move could only be made by the Government, some public servant or officer of the Court, or other appropriate authority.

It does not appear necessary for us to go into the old history of the writ of quo-warranto when it originated in England. The procedure in England has varied from time to time and we are only concerned with the procedure as it was followed in England when the writs or informations in the nature of quo-warranto were last being issued in England. Order 68 Rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court published in the Annual Practice 1935 shows that to writ of quo-warranto the provisions of Order 52 of the Rules of the Court were applicable. Order 52 made provision for the making of motions before the Supreme Court and consequently a motion for a writ of quo warranto could be made in exactly the same manner as any other motion before the Court. The latest case on this question that has been brought to our notice is that of - Rex v. Speyer, reported in (1916) 1 KB 595. The judgment of Lord Reading C.J., shows that in that case orders of the Court were made against Sir Edgar Speyer and Sir Ernest Joseph at the instance of Sir George Makgill. The Attorney General was only served with at notice subsequently. This clearly indicates that at least in 1915 when order for laying information in the nature of quo warranto was made, the application had been entertained at the instance of a private individual without the intervention of the Government or any public authority. Under Rules 1 and 7 of Chap.22 of the Rules of this Court 1952, an application for the issue of a writ of this nature has to be made to a Division Bench and by an advocate and not by the party personally. The present application was presented by an advocate who represented the petitioner before a Division Bench. The app





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