JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor. It arises out of the dismissal of certain objections filed by the appellant.

2. It appears that a decree for Rs.1486/-was passed on 7-10-1936, in favour of Suraj Prasad Singh, father of the respondents, against the appellant, Haji Khairullah. It was passed by the Court of the Additional Munsif. That Court appears to have been abolished soon after, namely, on 3-1-1937. It was, however, again revived after sometime and was in existence at the time when the first application for execution was made on 7-10-1939. That application was made to the Court of the Additional Munsif. Eventually, the application was dismissed for want of prosecution on 18-10-1939.

3. The next application for execution was made on 19-2-1943, which was dismissed on 30-3-1943. A third application for execution was made on 5-4-1943. It was dismissed on 25-5-1943. A fourth application for execution was made on 11-5-1946, and it was dismissed on 18-7-1946.

4. A fifth application for execution of the decree was made on 17-7-1943. It was made in the Court of the Munsif. It is this application which has given rise to the present appeal.

5. Objections were filed on behalf of the appellant to the execution of the decree. The main objection urged was that the application was barred by limitation inasmuch as the proceedings in connection with the first, second, third, and fourth applications for execution had not been validly taken. Reliance was placed on Art.182(5), Limitation Act. Under this provision, three years period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution.

6. The Courts below have dismissed the objection and have held that the application was made within time.

7-8. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the application is barred by time. His argument is that the Additional Munsifs Court which passed the decree on 7-10-1936 having been abolished and its business having been transferred to the Munsifs Court, it was the Munsifs Court alone which was competent to execute the decree. That being the position the four previous applications for execution of the decree filed in the Court of the Additional Munsif were not in accordance with law and consequently did not save limitation.

9. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the decision in - Maqbul Ahmad v. Pateshri Partab Narain Singh, AIR 1929 All 677 and in the case of - Mt. Champi Bai v. Peary Lal, AIR 1938 All 116.

10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the case of - Bibi Khodaijatul Kobra v. Harihar Missar, AIR 1926 Pat. 209. This is the ruling on which both the Courts below have also relied. It seems to me quite clear that in the present case, the Courts below have taken a correct view of the law.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited my attention to Ss.37, 38 and 150, Civil P.C. Section 37 defines the expression "the Court which passed the decree". Section 38 declares that a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The expression, "the Court which passed it" necessarily refers back to S.37 where the expression has been explained. Section 37(b) deals with a case where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute the decree. In such an event, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. In the present case, on the dates when the first four applications for execution of the decree were made, the Court of the Additional Munsif was in existence. Further that Court on that date would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit if the suit wherein the decree was passed was to be instituted on that date. It follows, therefore, that at the t

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