JUDGMENT :- This is a judgment-debtors appeal. The suit in which the decree in execution was passed had been filed on September 17, 1945, for ejectment and arrears of rent at Rs. 3-8-0 per mensem from June 30, to September 9, 1945. The decree in the suit was passed with the consent of the parties on January 2, 1947. It provided that the judgment-debtor appellant would vacate the house by August 1, 1947, and that, if he did not do so, the decree-holder-respondent would be entitled to execute the decree for ejectment. The decree-holders right to execute the decree after this date was not subject to any condition whatsoever, inasmuch as he could claim the defendants ejectment alter that date without any restrictions. As regards the rent payable to the plaintiff-decree-holder it was agreed that the defendant was entitled to deduct the amount spent by him on repairs, that the said amount would be determined by one Mr. Raghubar Sahai Raizada, counsel appearing for the plaintiff in the case and, lastly, that, if the amount so determined exceeded the arrears due to the plaintiff, the excess would be set off against future rent, but that, if it was less, it would proportionately reduce those arrears.

Admittedly, no ascertainment of the amount spent by the defendant on repairs was made by Mr. Raghubar Sahai Raisada. The lower appellate Court remarked in its judgment that the plaintiff had filed several applications alleging that her counsel had made various attempts to go to the house in order to estimate the amount spent on repairs but that for some reason or other the defendant evaded the matter. This would at least show that Mr. Raghubar Sahai was not able to ascertain the amount entirely on account of the dilatory tactics of the defendant.

2. On August 5, 1947, the decree-holder-respondent applied for the execution of the decree for ejectment. Objections were taken to this application on the ground that, under S. 14, U.P. (Temporary) Control of Bent and Eviction Act 3 of 1947. no ejectment could be ordered.

3. A few days later, on August 25, 1947, the respondent gave a notice to the appellant, demanding Rs. 91/- as rent from June 30, 1945 to August 30, (obviously meaning 31) 1947. On September 15, 1947 the appellant sent to the respondent a money order for Rs. 28/-, which the latter refused to accept.

4. Obviously the decree-holder claimed the respondents ejectment by his application of August 5, 1947, referred to above, on the strength of the consent decree of January 2, 1947. After he had served on the respondent the notice of August 25, 1947, Just mentioned, he claimed the respondents ejectment also on the ground that the latter had been guilty of wilful default within the meaning of cl. (a) of S. 3 of the aforesaid Act.

5. The objections filed by the appellant were allowed by the execution Court but dismissed by the lower appellate Court in appeal.

6. The main point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was that he could not be ejected in view of the provisions of S. 14 of the said Act. This section enacts : "No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3."

7. The section would apply only if the decree for ejectment was passed "before the date of commencement of this Act." The decree in this case, as already noted, had been passed on January 2, 1947. The Act in question received the consent of the Governor on February 28, 1947 and was published in the official gazette on March 1, 1947. Section 1(3) of the Act provides :

it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of October, 1946.

8. The question arises : what is the date which can be said to be "the date of commencement of this Act," that is, was this date the 28th February, 1947 or the 1st October, 1946 ? This date, 1st October,

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