SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1953 Supreme(All) 126

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHBAD
SAPRU, MUKERJI, JJ.
Raj Narain Singh
Versus
Atmaram Govind
Civil Misc. Appln. No. 20 of 1953
Decided On : 07-05-1953

Advocates:
Iqbal Ahmad, H.N. Misra, H.K. Ghose, Bishun Singh, Dakar Singh, Khuswaqt Rai and Jagdish Gopal Mathur, for Applicant; K.L. Misra, Advocate-General, B.K. Dhaon and Sachita Nand Sahai, for Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2.

Headnote:

The Court held that the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The Court further held that the order passed upon it is unconstitutional and should be declared to be so as the effect of it is to inflict a punishment for the second time upon his client for an offence for which he had been punished previously by the Speaker as the President of the House.

Fact of the Case:

The applicant, Shri Raj Narain Singh, is a member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly and was returned on the Praja Socialist Party ticket. He is the leader of the Praja Socialist Party which is the main opposition party in the Legislative Assembly. On the 4th March 1953, after question hour, Shri Raj Narain Singh requested the Chair to allow him to move a motion for adjournment of the House to discuss a matter of urgent public importance, namely the forcible removal by the police of three teachers who were on hunger-strike from the semi-circle opposite the Council House. According to the affidavit which has been filed in support of the application, the applicant had arrived in Lucknow from Banaras on the morning that very day. On his way to his residence at Darul-shafa quarters he saw the police encamped at the place previously occupied by the hunger-striking teachers. On enquiry he was reliably informed that they had been forcibly removed. Shri Raj Narain Singh thereafter contacted the Speaker on the telephone in order to obtain his consent to move the adjournment motion referred to before that day in the U.P. Assembly. He was advised by the Speaker to contact the Treasury Benches. He was unable to contact on the telephone the Leader of the House. He, however, spoke on the telephone to the Government Chief Whip who promised to consult the Leader of the House and intimate to him his reactions. He was not, however, told what the Government attitude towards his adjournment motion would be prior to his actually moving for leave to move the adjournment of the House to discuss that question. It would seem that prior to the discussion relating to the adjournment motion, Shri Narain Dutt Tiwari, a member of the Praja Socialist Party, also saw the Speaker in his chambers along with the applicant. He requested him to allow him to move for the suspension under Rule 221 of Rule 71(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly requiring before an adjournment motion is allowed 1/12th of the total number of members of the house to rise in support of the adjournment motion, where objection to its discussion is raised. After question hour on that day, Shri Raj Narain Singh was allowed by the Speaker to make a short statement about the matter and to ask for leave of the House to move his adjournment motion. The applicant thereafter rose in his seat and after a short statement asked for the leave of the House. Objection to leave being granted was taken by the Minister for Home Affairs, Shri Sampurnanand. On that being done, the Speaker asked the members who were prepared to support the motion to rise in their places so that he might be able to find out if the requisite number of thirty-six members was there to support the motion for leave. At that stage there was an intervention by another member, Shri Narain Dutt Tiwari. He requested the Speaker to give his consent under Rule 221 to enable him to move the suspension of Rule 71(3). Rule 71(3) requires that at least one-twelfth of the total number of the House, i.e., 39 members must rise in support of the motion for leave before such a motion can be considered if objection is taken by any member to its being taken up. The Speaker was not prepared to allow a consideration of the question of suspension of the rule under Rule 221 as it was a day fixed for the voting of the demands. An assurance was, however, given by the Speaker that permission to move the motion for the suspension of the rule would be given by him at 5 Oclock in the evening. Meanwhile, he asked the members supporting the motion for leave to discuss the motion to rise in their places. The applicant thereafter requested the Speaker to take up the motion of Shri N.D. Tiwari first as his motion would become infructuous if the permission to suspend the rule was not given then and there. This the Speaker was not prepared to do. The applicant was, however, insistent that the decision on the question of the motion of Shri Narain Dutt Tiwari should be given in accordance with their desire as the party of which he was the leader had only twenty-two members and could not get thirty-six members to rise in their seats. The Speaker pointed out that it was not possible for him to comply with, his request as it was a day fixed for voting demands. He further directed the applicant not to obstruct the business of the House and observed that he could not understand how he would be able to get a majority to support his motion if he could not get even 36 members to rise in support of his motion for leave. The applicant again made a request with folded hands for the immediate consideration of the motion for the suspension of the rule but it was not granted by the Speaker. On about three occasions, the applicant was asked by the Speaker to sit down; but, as he was not prepared to take notice of even the- points of order raised, the Speaker asked him to withdraw from the House. The applicant did not comply with that direction. Thereafter the Speaker drew the attention of the House to the defiant attitude adopted by the applicant and ordered the police to remove him from the Assembly Hall by using the minimum amount of force necessary for that purpose. On being so ordered, the police forcibly removed the applicant by bodily lifting him from the Assembly Hall, he having squatted on the floor of the House. Similar scenes happened in the case of two other members, namely, Shri Ram Narain Tripathi and Shri Jagannath Mal, They were both ejected forcibly from the Hall. It may be mentioned that, while Shri Jagannath Mal used language which cast reflection on the impartiality of the Chair, there was at that time no allegation that the applicant had used any language attributing any bias to the chair.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The Court further held that the order passed upon it is unconstitutional and should be declared to be so as the effect of it is to inflict a punishment for the second time upon his client for an offence for which he had been punished previously by the Speaker as the President of the House.

Issues: 1. Whether the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution? 2. Whether the order passed upon it is unconstitutional and should be declared to be so as the effect of it is to inflict a punishment for the second time upon his client for an offence for which he had been punished previously by the Speaker as the President of the House?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The Court further held that the order passed upon it is unconstitutional and should be declared to be so as the effect of it is to inflict a punishment for the second time upon his client for an offence for which he had been punished previously by the Speaker as the President of the House. 2. The Court held that the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The Court further held that the order passed upon it is unconstitutional and should be declared to be so as the effect of it is to inflict a punishment for the second time upon his client for an offence for which he had been punished previously by the Speaker as the President of the House.

Final Decision: The Court held that the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The Court further held that the order passed upon it is unconstitutional and should be declared to be so as the effect of it is to inflict a punishment for the second time upon his client for an offence for which he had been punished previously by the Speaker as the President of the House.

Judgement

SAPRU, J. :- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The applicant, Shri Raj Narain Singh, is a member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly having been returned on the Praja Socialist Party ticket which is the main opposition party in the Legislative Assembly. He has the distinction of being the parliamentary leader of that party and, as such, is the leader of the opposition. The opposite parties to this application are the Speaker of the Assembly, Shri A.G. Kher, and the Secretary, Shri Kailash Chandra Bhatnagar. The reliefs sought by the applicant are that this Court may be pleased (a) to declare that the resolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of part III of the Constitution, (b) to call for the records of the U.P. Legislative Assembly proceedings dated the 30th March 1953, the proceedings of the privileges Committee dated the 7th, 17th, 25th and the 26th March 1953 and quash the resolution dated the 30th March 1953, (c) to issue a suitable order, writ or direction asking the opposite parties to expunge the above-mentioned resolution of the said Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 from the proceedings of the U.P. Legislative Assembly and (d) to order the payment of costs to the petitioner.

2. I should have been disposed to reject this application on the simple ground that it is not competent to this Court, for reasons to be indicated hereafter, to grant the reliefs asked for had it not been for the fact that the learned Advocate-General has made it clear that the opposite-parties do not wish to take their stand on the technical ground that the reliefs are not properly framed. Repeatedly this Court has emphasised that a party seeking relief under Article 226 off the Constitution should precisely state what writ, order or direction it is that he seeks for redressing a wrong which affects him personally. That the prayer for relief in this application has not been properly framed and does not clearly indicate the exact nature of the relief sought is not, indeed, denied by learned Counsel for the applicant. It is urged, however, that the writ jurisdiction being comparatively a new one so far as this Court is concerned and its practice being largely unfamiliar to the Lucknow Bench of the Court, we should not reject the application on the ground of the unsatisfactory nature of the prayer, if we are satisfied that the case is otherwise a fit one for granting some kind of relief. It is contended that we should look to the substance rather than to the form of the relief and that if that be done it will be found that what the applicant seeks is that the wrong done by a resolution which the applicant maintains was illegal and affected his rights as a member of the legislature should be redressed.

I would however, like to point out that the reliefs as they stand do not seek to enforce a personal right of the applicant which has been infringed. The applicant has merely asked for a declaratory relief. No relief is claimed quashing any unjust punishment supposed to have been inflicted upon the applicant in violation of any fundamental right. Further, it will be observed that there is no prayer seeking for a relief restraining any authority from carrying out that punishment which has, indeed, exhausted itself. The point that I wish to make is that the relief, as claimed has no relation to the rights of the petitioner. An application for a writ in the nature of mandamus or such like order or direction is not maintainable unless it has been filed by a person whose right is said to have been directly affected (see - Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secy. to Govt., Uttar Pradesh, Labour Department, Lucknow, AIR 1951 All 1 (FB) (A)).

3. It will be seen that the writ is directed against the Speaker of the U.P. Legislative Assembly and the Secretary of the said Assembly. Why Mr. Speaker and the Secretary have been impleaded has not bee













































































































































































































Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top