MALIK, CJ.:- This case was referred to a Bench of five Judges by our brothers Sankar Saran and Gurtu who were of the opinion that the decision of the Full Bench in - Chunna Mal v. Bhagwant Kishore, AIR 1936 All 584 (A) needed reconsideration. In that case the point referred to the Full Bench for decision was as follows:

"Whether after rejecting the application for permission to sue as a pauper, can the court by a separate and subsequent order allow the applicant to pay the requisite court-fee under S.149, Civil P.C., and treat the application as a plaint."

The facts given in that judgment are that the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis was rejected on 29-9-1934. On 1-10-1934, an application was made for review on the ground of discovery of some new material to prove that the applicant was a pauper. This application was rejected, but at the time of rejecting the application time was granted to pay the court-fee. Sulaiman, C.J., Bennet and Allsop, JJ., all agreed that, after the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis had been finally disposed of, it was not possible for the court to grant time under S.149, as there was no document before the court to which S.149 of the Code could apply. The learned Judges also considered the question, whether at the time of rejecting the pauper application the court could grant time to pay the court-fee. Sulaiman, C.J., and Bennet, J., were of the opinion that even while dismissing the pauper application the court could not by the same order grant time to pay the court-fee. Mr. Justice Allsop took a different view.

2. The second point on which the learned Judges had differed was again referred to a Full Bench, and it came up before a Bench of which three of us were members, but the judgment has not yet been delivered - Divendar Kumar v. Mahant Raghuraj Bharti, AIR 1955 All 154 (FB) (B) since reported. There was another case under O.33 in which there was a difference of opinion between one of us and Pearey Lal Bhargava, J. Pearey Lal Bhargava, J., was of the opinion that on the death of the petitioner no rights survived and the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis could not be continued by the legal representatives of the deceased.

The other view was that, if the legal representatives were themselves paupers, they could claim in their own right to continue the application to sue in forma pauperis and, in case it was held that they were paupers and that the application filed by their predecessor was a bona fide application, the suit would be deemed to have been filed when the original petition was presented in court. The case was again referred to a Full Bench which held that on the death of the petitioner his legal representatives could pay the court-fees and continue the suit or if they were themselves paupers they could apply to continue the proceedings without payment of court-fees, and in that connection discussed the nature of an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis and agreed with the view expressed by Allsop, J., in - Chunna Mals case (A); Latifunnissa v. Mst. Khairunnissa, (S) AIR 1955 All 53 (FB) (C).

3. There can be no doubt that an order under S.149 of the Code can only be passed when there is a document still before the court, and once the court has lost seisin of the case and there is no document before it, it cannot grant time to pay the court-fee under that section.

4. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has urged that on 13-11-1943, at the time when the court was passing the order on the pauper application an oral request was made to the court to grant time and the court asked the applicant to make a written application, and the order of the 19th of November was, therefore, passed on an oral prayer made on the 13th of November while the court was still seised of the case. But the application of the 13th of November does not bear out that contention. On the other hand, from the application it appears that it was filed not before the c