AGARWALA, J.:- This is a judgment-debtors appeal arising out of execution proceedings. A preliminary decree for partition of certain joint family property was passed on 18-5-1933 against the appellant and his father. They filed an appeal to the High Court which was dismissed on 30-3-1939. They went up to the Privy Council in appeal. The appeal was, however, dismissed with costs on 6-4-1948. During the pendency of the appeal to the Privy Council the trial court passed the final decree on 28-4-1945. This decree was against the appellant alone as his Father Basdeo Sahai had died during the pendency of the appeal in the Privy Council.

The decree directed a partition of the immoveable property in suit, and also awarded to the plaintiff a certain amount to be paid by the appellant An execution application to execute the final decree was made on 9-9-1949 as against the appellant and the prayer was to realise the amount decreed by attachment and sale of the personal property of the appellant. The execution application was obviously within three years of the decision of the appeal from the preliminary decree by the Privy Council, but beyond three years of the date of the final decree.

Ramesh Chandra objected to the execution of the decree on several grounds out of which we are concerned only with two in the present appeal, namely that the execution application was barred by time as it was made more than three years after the date of the final decree and that the decree could not be executed against the personal property of Ramesh Chandra, judgment-debtor. These objections were dismissed by the court below and the judgment-debtor has now come up in appeal to this Court.

2. So far as the objection regarding the execution of the decree against the personal property of Ramesh Chandra is concerned, the execution Court is bound by the terms of the decree and cannot go behind them. The decree as passed was against the appellant personally. It has, therefore, to be executed against him as such.

3. As regards the objection that the execution application was barred by time, the point to be decided is whether the starting point of time for computing the period of limitation for execution of a final decree in a suit can be the date of the order of the appellate court in an appeal not from the final decree itself but from the preliminary decree. There appears to be a conflict of authority in India on the point. The matter is governed by the provisions of Art.182, cl. (2), Limitation Act. Article 182 runs as follows :

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"For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by Art.183 or by S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)- Three years; or, where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered, six years, (1) The date of the decree or order, or (2) (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal."

The normal starting point for the period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order is the date of the decree or order, but the starting point in a case in which there has been an appeal, is the "date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court"

4. In clause (2), the words used are simply "where there has been an appeal", and it is not indicated as to whether the appeal is to be from the decree or order sought to be executed or from some other decree or order. No doubt the appeal obviously has to be in the very suit or proceeding in which the decree or order sought to be executed was passed and an appeal wholly unconnected with the order or decree sought to be executed cannot obviously have been intended.

The language of Art.182(2) is word for word the same as it was under the Limitation Act 15 of 1877 and under that Act in - Narsingh Sewak Singh v. Madho Das, 4 All 274 (A) a Division Bench of this Court expressed the opinion that the words "where there has been an appeal" in cl. (2) of Art.179 of the