HIGH COURT OF ALLAHBAD
D. S. MATHUR, J.
Atar Singh
Versus
State
Criminal Revn. No. 509 of 1963
Decided On : 14-10-1963
ARMS ACT - ARMS ACT, 1959 - SEC. 1(3) - VALIDITY - DELEGATED LEGISLATION - NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant, Atar Singh, was convicted of possessing a country-made pistol and two live cartridges without a license under Sec. 19(f) of the Arms Act. He challenged the conviction on legal grounds, arguing that the Arms Act, 1959, was not in force at the time of the offense and that the trial could not proceed without the District Magistrate's sanction.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the Arms Act, 1959, did not come into force until October 1962, as specified in Sec. 1(3) of the Act. Therefore, the Indian Arms Act, 1878, remained in force until that date. The court also held that Sec. 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, which gave the Central Government the power to determine the date of commencement of the Act, was not unconstitutional as it did not amount to delegated legislative authority.
Issues: 1. Whether the Arms Act, 1959, was in force at the time of the offense. 2. Whether the trial could proceed without the District Magistrate's sanction. 3. Whether Sec. 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, was unconstitutional.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Sec. 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, and Sec. 5 of the Central General Clauses Act to conclude that the Arms Act, 1959, did not come into operation until October 1962. 2. The court held that since the Arms Act, 1959, was not in force at the time of the offense, the Indian Arms Act, 1878, remained in force, and the trial could proceed under that Act. 3. The court held that Sec. 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, was not unconstitutional as it did not amount to delegated legislative authority. The court reasoned that the legislature could delegate the power to fix the date of commencement of the Act to the Government, considering various factors such as the availability of resources and the need for a gradual implementation of the law.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the conviction of the applicant.
2. The conviction has been challenged on a legal ground and also on facts. It may here be mentioned that the finding of fact recorded by the lower courts cannot be said to be improper and hence cannot be interfered with in Revision.
3. The Arms Act, 1959, received the assent of the President on December 23, 1959, though it came into force sometimes in October 1962. The present offence was committed on 14-2-1962 and the police submitted the charge sheet and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence long before the Arms Act, 1959, came into force. However, in view of S. 46 of the Arms Act, 1959, by which the Indian Arms Act, 1878, was repealed, it is contended that on the date the offence was committed and also on the date the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, the Indian Arms Act, 1878, stood repealed and the prosecution could be under the Arms Act, 1959, after it became a law. In the alternative, it is contended that after the coming into force of the Arms Act, 1959, it was necessary for the prosecution to obtain, sanction of the District Magistrate and without such sanction the trial could not proceed though before the commencement of the Act the trial for an offence committed under the old Act could proceed.
4. Section 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, makes it clear that the Arms Act, 1959, was to come into force on such date as the Central Government may by government notification in the official gazette appoint. In other words, even though the Arms Act, 1959, was passed by the Parliament and received the assent of the President, it did not come into force at once and did not become the law of the country till the notification was issued by the Central Government and published in the official gazette. The ordinary meaning that can be assigned to S. 1(3) of the Act, therefore is that the Arms Act, 1959, did not come into operation before October 1962 and, for all practical purposes, this Act did not exist till October 1962 and prior to that the Indian Arms Act, 1878, remained in force. The same inference can be drawn from S. 5 of the Central General Clauses Act. Section 5 clearly provides that a Central Act comes into operation on the date on which it receives the assent of the President only if the date of coming into operation of the Act is not expressed therein. In the instant case S. 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, clearly laid down the date on which the new Act was to come into force.
5. The Indian Arms Act, 1878, stood repealed under S. 46 of the Arms Act, 1959. When the whole of the Arms Act, 1959, did not come into force till October 1962, S. 46 of that Act was not in operation till that date. In other words, the Indian Arms Act, 1878, stood repealed in October 1962 and not earlier.
6. The last point contended on behalf of the applicant is that S. 1(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, is ultra vires as it amounts to a delegated legislation. It is contended that the legislature should have laid down a reasonably clear statement of policy with regard to the enforcement of the enactment either it could be indicated on which date the Act shall come into force or it should have been indicated when and in what circumstances the Act was to be enforced by the Central Government. Reliance was placed upon certain observations made in M/s. Bhatnagars and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1957 SC 478. The observations relied upon pertain to the enactment itself and not the date of its commencement. With regard to the date of Commencement of an Act duly passed by the legislature, the Courts of law need not be as strict as in the interpretation of enactments passed by the legislature. The Legislature gives expression t
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