Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri S.C. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri V.D. Yadav, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, learned Standing Counsel and learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha.

2. Through this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 3.10.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short, ‘DDC’), by which the revision filed by Sumiran against the Gaon Sabha has been allowed.

3. Sri Tripathi contends that impugned order has been passed by the learned DDC without notice to the petitioners as the petitioners were not impleaded as party in the aforesaid revision, whereas they have been materially affected by the order of the DDC. He has also brought on record the memo of the revision from the perusal of which, it transpires that only Gaon Sabha was impleaded as respondent.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the writ petition.

5. Learned counsel for the parties agree that the writ petition may be disposed of on its own merit on the legal premises. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal.

6. It is not in dispute that the revision was filed by respondent No. 2 against the order dated 3.11.2010 passed in appeal No. 517 (Sumiran v. State and others) passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. The revision has been allowed taking note of the facts that by virtue of allowing the revision, chak holder Nos. 534, 248, 212 and 292 would be affected. Petitioners are the chak holders of 292 and 212. From the perusal of the memo of revision, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, it is clear that in the revision, only Gaon Sabha was impleaded as a party and not the petitioners. On being confronted as to whether respondent No. 2 was made party in the revision or not, learned counsel contends that from the perusal of the memo of revision, which has been brought on record, it is clear that any of the chak holders, whose chaks have been affected by the impugned order, has not been impleaded as a party, meaning thereby, the order impugned is defective for non-joinder of necessary parties and also suffers from breach of principles of natural justice.

7. The Apex Court in the case of D.K.Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 SCC 259, has observed as under:

“The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily effecting the rights of the concerned person.

It is fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272; the Constitution Bench held that ‘Civil consequences’ covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence.

In State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284: AIR 1952 SC 75: 1952 Cri LJ 510; per majority, a seven judge Bench held that the rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978)