Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard learned Standing Counsel for applicants-appellants and Sri Anil sharma, Advocate for respondent.

2. This is a second appeal instituted by State of U.P. through District Magistrate, Bijnor and another and has been filed beyond period of limitation by one year and 322 days, i.e., almost two years. The appeal is accompanied with this application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1963”) seeking condonation of delay. The affidavit accompanying this application gives nothing but a superficial eye wash explanation having several wide gaps in the prospective of period. In brief, the chronological events given in affidavit to explain delay, read as under:

3. In the aforesaid narration, after sending opinion by DGC on 10.3.2011, there is no explanation for a period of about one and half years and more inasmuch as the applicants applied for fresh certified copy of judgment on 1.10.2012 but what happened to earlier certified copy of judgment and what proceedings were taken, the affidavit is totally silent except of stating that earlier certified copy lost somewhere but no inquiry, no investigation and no action against anybody stated to have been taken by applicants. It is also not clear at what stage and from when the certified copy was misplaced or lost. The explanation is extremely sketchy and in a usual casual, careless and negligence manner.

4. It is true that when State is a party, and file appeal with some delay, it may deserve some leverage for official hierarchical steps for permission etc. but a wholly unexplained, reckless and negligent approach of delay running in almost one and half years and more cannot be overlooked particularly when it is not the case of applicants that they have taken any action against erring individual.

5. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

6. In the matters where action is brought by Government, no person is individually affected and in ultimate analysis it is the public interest which suffers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristic of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation though is equal and apply at par to both private individual and Government but where the Government makes out a case of sufferings to public interest owing to acts of fraud and bad faith on the part of its officials and agents, and also, the intention of Government not to allow such officers of doubtful integrity to go scot free, the Court should also come forward to do justice in the interest of public at large, but, a mere eye wash kind of explanation, without any honest intention of State authorities to proceed against tainted officers, or, those who have acted in a bad faith, or, those who have worked negligently, the explanation that delay must be condoned in public interest would be superficial and lacking bona fide, hence difficult to be accepted by Court.

7. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897, in para 8 of the judgment, the Court said:

“8. . . . . . . . Therefore, in assessing what