Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Manish Kumar Srivastava appearing for the contesting respondents.

2. This writ petition has been filed by the landlord under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 22.10.2011 passed by Prescribed Authority in P. A. Case No. 36 of 1987 allowing the impleadment of respondent No. 1.

3. Dispute relates to House No. K-63/32, Bhoot Bhairo, Nakhas, District Varanasi. Petitioners claiming to be landlord initiated proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the ground of bona fide need. During the pendency of the release application, respondent Nos. 14 and 15, herein, are alleged to have sold out their share to the extent of 2/6 in favour of respondent No. 1, Smt. Tanveer Jahan wife of Mohd. Yasin, who was arrayed as opposite party No. 3 in the release application, which was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide order impugned in this petition.

4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that purchaser-respondent No. 1 (herein) is neither a necessary nor proper party to the proceedings and thus could not be joined as an opposite party in the release application. It was also submitted that Prescribed Authority under the Act has no jurisdiction to decide title to the property and only question is to be considered as to whether the landlord is entitled to release of the accommodation in his favour on the ground mentioned in the application. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that it was not even the case of opposite party No. 1 that she was entitled to receive rent.

5. In reply, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents tried to justify the impugned order.

6. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were landlord and owners of the property. Case set up by respondent No. 1 seeking impleadment in the proceedings of release was that she purchased 2/6 share of the house in dispute from one of the co-owners/landlord as such was a necessary party to be impleaded in the proceedings. There is nothing on record to indicate the fact that the tenants against whom release application was filed ever disputed the fact that petitioners were landlord and the rent was being paid to them. Clause (j) of Section 3 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 defines “landlord” as a person to whom rent is payable. The only question to be considered was relationship of landlord and tenant and the bona fide need and comparative hardship. The issue of ownership/title of the property in dispute was never to be considered nor could be decided by the prescribed authority under the provisions of the Act.

7. The principles governing impleadment of a party are embodied in Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. It is indicated therein that a party may be either necessary party or proper party. A person, who ought to have been joined as party, is necessary party. This is so, because no effective decision can be given without his presence. A person is a proper party if his presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.

8. In the case of Smt. Prabha Saxena v. II Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 1989 (2) ARC 197, while considering the question of impleadment of third party claiming himself to be co-owner/landlord in a suit between landlord and tenant, it has been held in paragraphs 3 and 4 as under :

“3. The close question that arises for determination is whether in a suit between landlord and tenant, a third person claiming to be a co-owner of the property can intervene and seek to be added as a party. In my opinion by allowing such a course to be adopted, a simple suit between landlord and tenant could be converted into a suit for title between the landlord and a third person. In fact in a suit between the landlord and ten