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2013 Supreme(All) 70

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
CHHIDDI SINGH @ CHHEDDA SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) AND OTHERS ....Petitioners
Versus
SUKKHI SINGH ....Respondent
(Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 647 of 2013, decided on 8th January, 2013)

Advocates:
Counsel :
Neelam Pandey and Pankaj Rai for the Petitioner.

Headnote:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order XXI, Rule 106, Sections 38 and 37—Execution—Application for—Dismissal in default—Fresh application for, within time—Dismissal of first execution application in default without adjudicating any rights of parties would not operate as res-judicata—Merely for reason that decree holder has a remedy to seek recall—Does not mean that he has no right to apply afresh if time permits—However, transfer of land in question to another district would not affect jurisdiction of Civil Court at place ‘B’ to execute decree. [Paras 3 and 4]

JUDGMENT

Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—Heard Sri Pankaj Rai holding brief of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.

This writ petition arises out of execution of a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell. Petitioners objections to the execution have been dismissed by the impugned order dated 4.9.2012 which has been upheld by the revisional Court vide judgment and order dated 11.12.2012.

2. In impugning the above orders, three arguments have been advanced by Sri Pankaj Rai.

The first and the foremost argument is that an earlier application for execution was dismissed in default on 30.4.2010 and, therefore, afresh application was not maintainable.

There is no dispute that the earlier application was dismissed in default without going into its merits. The subsequent application for execution was within time. The dismissal of the first execution application in default without adjudicating any rights of the parties would not operate as res judicata.

3. Merely for the reason that the decree holder has a remedy to seek recall of the order dismissing execution in default under Rule 106 of Order 21 C.P.C. does not mean that he has no right to apply afresh if time permits. It is settled law that if two remedies are available, a party can choose anyone of them. Therefore, it was not necessary for the decree holder to have applied for recall of the order dismissing execution in default.

In view of the above, the first submission has no force and is rejected.

4. The second argument is that the property in respect of which the agreement was executed and the decree was passed is now in district Gautam Budh Nagar and, therefore, the Court at Bulandshahar has no jurisdiction to execute the same.

The execution is for the purpose of executing the sale-deed pursuant to the decree for specific performance which is only a ministerial act. It can be done by the Court at Bulandshahr irrespective of the location of the property as the decree was passed by the Court at Bulandshahr.

Apart from the above, Section 38 C.P.C. provides that a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. Section 37 C.P.C. explains the expression “Court which passed a decree”. In its explanation it provides that a Court of first instance does not cease to have jurisdiction to execute a decree merely on the ground that after the institution of the suit or after the passing of the decree any area stands transferred from the jurisdiction of that Court to the jurisdiction of any other Court.

It means the Court of first instance continues to hold the jurisdiction of execution of a decree irrespective of the fact that the area concerning the property has ceased to be within its jurisdiction. Thus, it is clear that the transfer of the land in question to the district Gautam Budh Nagar would not affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Bulandshahr to execute the decree.

5. The last argument raised by Sri Pankaj Rai is that the decree holder has not deposited the balance sale consideration of Rs. 5000/- and, therefore, the contract would stand rescinded and the sale-deed cannot be executed. In support of this he has placed reliance upon two decisions; one of the Supreme Court in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alaqappan, AIR 1999 SC 918 : 1999 All CJ 1521 and the other of this Court in Narottam v. Ganpati Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd., 2007 (10) ADJ 631.

In both the above decisions, the Court while passing the decree had provided time period to the decree holder for depositing the sale consideration and it was in context with that the Courts held that the deposit of the balance amount is mandatory and if it is not so deposited the execution cannot proceed. This is not the situation in the present case. The decree passed herein is only to the effect that the judgment debtor would execute the sale-deed after realizing the balance sale consideration of Rs. 5,000/-. There is no direction to the decre





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