2013 Supreme(All) 1172
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.
U.P. STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER ....Appellants
Versus
MAHESH CHANDRA GUPTA AND OTHERS ....Respondents
(Second Appeal No. 724 of 2005, decided on 24th April, 2013)
Counsel :
Sharad Sharma and S.K. Mishra for the Appellants; Vipul Kumar, Vinod Sinha and Mahesh Sharma for the Respondents.
Headnote:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Section 100—Second appeal—Substantial question of law—Absence of—Whether document in question is “licence agreement” and “licensee”—Determination of—Mere terminology used by authorities cannot govern a document—If in effect and substance, nature of document is different—Document in question is a lease, containing terms and conditions of a lease relating to immovable property—Hence, no substantial question of law involved. [Paras 3, 7 and 8]
Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—The appeal has been restored to original number vide order of date passed on restoration application, as requested by learned counsel for the parties, I proceed to hear the appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 since both the parties are represented.
2. Heard Sri S.K.Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Mahesh Sharma, Advocate holding brief of Sri Vinod Sinha, Advocate for the respondents.
3. This is defendant’s second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The plaintiff instituted original suit No. 79 of 1984 seeking declaration that order dated 11.11.1983 of defendants-appellant is illegal and that plaintiff be given possession over plot No. C-67 as he was illegally dispossessed and a mandatory injunction be also issued directing defendants not to interfere in possession of plaintiff over plot in dispute after handing over its possession to the plaintiff.
4. The facts, in brief, are that plot No. C-67, Industrial Area, Sikandara was allotted to plaintiff vide letter dated 14.10.1981 by defendants-appellants for which an agreement was executed on 27.2.1982. The plaintiff was required to pay certain amount in instalments. He was also supposed to raise construction over plot in dispute in furtherance of commencement of commercial establishment for the purpose whereof the aforesaid plot was allotted. The possession was handed over to the plaintiff on 15.4.1982. As per the allotment letter dated 14.10.1981, plaintiff was supposed to commence construction within 9 months and to complete the same within 18 months. The plaintiff committed default in payment of instalment and also did not raise any construction hence allotment was cancelled by letter dated 11.11.1983.
5. The plaintiff contended that he was not given possession in time and his plan submitted for construction was not cleared and therefore defendants on one hand failed themselves from observing due formalities and on the other hand have tried to take advantage of their own wrong, acted illegally in cancelling allotment and re-entering disputed property even before its cancellation, which was wholly without authority of law.
6. The suit has been decreed by Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 11.10.1989 and judgment has been confirmed by lower Appellate Court also by dismissing defendants-appellants’ appeal No. 121 of 1990 vide judgment dated 22.2.2000.
7. Before this Court, Sri S.K.Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants sought to argue that there was no lease deed executed between the parties and document, which was executed on 27.2.1982 was nothing but a ‘license agreement’ and ‘license’ could have been cancelled at any point of time and there is a manifest error in the impugned judgments. He, however, despite repeated query, could not specify as to how agreement dated 27.2.1982 could be read as an agreement containing terms and conditions of alleged license. The mere terminology used by authorities cannot govern a document if in effect and substance, nature of document is different.
8. In the present case, long term lease was extended in favour of plaintiff on a consideration and therefore, it was clearly a document containing terms and conditions of a lease relating to an immoveable property. Besides above, with respect to question as to whether plaintiff or defendants was at fault, I find that both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact holding defendants at fault and their action has been found patently illegal. In absence of any perversity or irregularities in the findings, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgments particularly when counsel for the appellant could not show that Courts below have considered any inadmissible evidence or have ignored any relevant and admissible evidence in recording the concurrent findings against appellants. In absence of any illegality, I do not find that any substantial question of law has arisen in this appeal.
9. However, before parting, this Co