By the Court.—We have heard Sri Sanjay Kumar Nigam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri A.C. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant. We have also heard Sri A.K. Srivastava, the learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.

2. The case was listed for hearing argument on condonation of delay of 26 days, which has been reported by the Stamp Reporter of the Court. However, when the matter was called out and we had a glance of the impugned judgment passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 105 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Kanpur Dehat dated 25.7.2013, we had another issue before us and we found it necessary first to decide that issue, then only the matter could be proceeded further. We are not going onto the merits of the appeal, and to the question as to whether the reported delay of 26 days in filing the appeal could be condoned or not merely because, in our opinion, the very procedure, which was adopted by the learned trial Judge to carry out the trial of the case was palpably illegal and against the provisions of the Special Act, i.e. U.P. Dacoity Affected Areas Act, 1983.

3. Before we advert to the provisions of the Special Act noted above, we want to have a glance on a few provisions of the Cr.P.C. Ordinarily, power of taking cognisance in the Cr.P.C. is vested into a Magistrate as per the provisions of Section 190, but there are other provisions also, which have vested powers of taking cognizance in other Courts also, like, the Court of Session. One such provision under Section 193 Cr.P.C. reads as under:

“Section 193 : Cognisance of offences by Courts of Session.—Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code.”

As per the provision, a Court of Session can take cognisance of an offence, which is completely different from taking cognizance of an offence as a ‘Court of original jurisdiction’, if the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. In Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, 1993 SCC (Cri) 470, the terminology ‘as a Court of original jurisdiction’ was considered by the Supreme Court while it was considering the full bench judgment of the Patna High Court in S.K Latfur Rahman and others v. State of Bihar, 1985 Cr LJ 1238. It was held by Their Lordships that the terminology ‘as a Court of original jurisdiction’ indicated that the Court should be clothed with all the powers of a Magistrate, when it goes to take cognisance of an offence and in that context it was held that as soon as the case was committed the Court of Session that Court was empowered to apply its mind to the case diary and to summon any other person, who had not been sent up by the police for trial at the very stage of applying its mind to reach a conclusion as to whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding against any accused persons by framing charges. We are not concerned with that issue as to whether the Court of Session could be empowered to summon an additional accused at the time of hearing under Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., because that judgment of the Supreme Court was over-ruled by a larger bench in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 4618 (SC), but that judgment of Ranjit Singh did not express any difference of opinion as regards the explanation given by Kishun Singh on the terminology ‘as a Court of original jurisdiction’.

4. The very provisions of Section 193 Cr.P.C. itself indicate that the Court of Session may also take cognisance of an offence, if it is empowered to do so by any other law for the time being in force. This provision is completely in consonance with the saving clause contained in Section 5 of the Cr.P.C., which lays down that nothing contained in the Code shall in the absence