Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Learned Standing Counsel fairly stated that the issue raised in this case is a pure question of law which has to be determined by construction of agreement, Annexure 1 to the writ petition, so as to find out whether it results in grant of a “Lease” in the garb of a “Memorandum of Licence” or, in fact, it is a “Licence” only and, therefore, the writ petition may be heard finally at this very stage under the Rules of the Court, as he does not propose to file any counter-affidavit but would address this Court from the documents available on record as also the statutory provisions and various authorities on the subject. In these circumstances, I proceed to hear this matter at length so as to decide finally at this stage under the Rules of the Court.

2. Heard Sri Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel for petitioner, and, learned Standing Counsel for respondents.

3. The question up for consideration in this writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, which has arisen from the orders dated 5.12.2012 passed by Additional Collector (Administration), Gautambudh Nagar and 30.12.2013 passed by Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, U.P., Allahabad, is “whether the instrument in question can be said to be an “Agreement to License” as claimed by petitioner or it is an instrument of “Lease”, as held by respondents 1 and 2".

4. It is said that New Okhala Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “NOIDA”) executed a lease-deed in favour of International Recreation Parks (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Original Lessee”) for a term of 90 years. The Original Lessee executed an agreement treating it to be an “Agreement to License” with the petitioners on 12.3.2007 in respect whereto respondent No. 2 taken the view that there is an evasion of stamp duty since instrument in question executed between the petitioner and Original Lessee is an instrument of “Lease” and, therefore, ought to have been stamped accordingly, but that has not been done. He consequently issued notice dated 2.9.2008 to petitioner mentioning its address as under:

M/s Pantaloon Retail India Ltd.

328A Plot No. A-2 Sector 38A NOIDA

5. The notice was sought to be served personally and Process Server submitted his report that an employee or Manager of the Company, after reading notice, refused to accept the same and, therefore, it was pasted on the gate of aforesaid establishment and treating the said service sufficient, respondent No. 2 passed order dated 5.12.2012 determining stamp duty payable by petitioner to the tune of Rs. 82,84,624/- and imposing a penalty of Rs. 1,70,000,00/- raising demand of a total sum of Rs. 2,52,84,524/-. Petitioner thereagainst came to this Court in Writ Petition No. 9273 of 2013 which was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy vide order dated 4.3.2013. Thereafter, petitioner preferred Appeal Under Section 56 (1-A) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1899”) which has been rejected by respondent No. 1 by order dated 30.12.2013.

6. Both the authorities have held that instrument in question though termed as “Agreement to License” in fact is a “Lease-Deed” executed for a period of 9 years subject to renewal on three years with a further condition of increase in rent by 15 per cent every third year and, therefore, stamp thereon is chargeable under Schedule-1 Entry 35 (1) (iii) of Act, 1899. Sri Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel for petitioner, contended that the agreement is nothing but a “Licence” and respondents 1 and 2 have committed manifest error in treating it to be a “Lease”, so as to demand exorbitant stamp duty, which is patently arbitrary, illegal and contrary to law. He further placed reliance on several authority of this Court which I shall discuss later on.

7. Learned Standing Counsel, on the contrary, stated that from a careful reading of various clauses and stipulations in the instrument in question, it is evident that it is an instrument of “Leas