A nominee under Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act 1938 is not entitled to any interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy holder and is merely an agent or trustee of the legal representatives of the deceased policy holder.

R.R. Rastogi, J.

1. THIS civil revision arises out of proceedings under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act. One Hari Gopal had taken two life insurance policies for a total sum of Rs. 11,850/-in the year 1966. At that time he was a bachelor and he made his father Sri Kishan Lal as his nominee in those policies. Later on he was married to Smt. Shobha Sharma, who is the applicant before this Court, on 11-3-1969. He died on 24-12-1970. The nominee, Sri Kishan Lal, made a will on 10-8-1971 in favour of his own son Keshav Narain, who is opposite party No. 1 in the present revision application. By that will Kishan Lal bequeathed the amount payable under the aforesaid two policies to Keshav Narain. Kishan Lal died on 18-5-1971. Thereafter Keshav Narain made an application under Section 372 (1) of the Succession Act for issue of a succession certificate so as to enable him to obtain payment of the money payable under the aforesaid two policies. The opposite-parties were his own mother Smt. Laxmi Devi and two, others including the widow of the assured, Smt. Shobha Sharma.

2. SMT. Shobha Sharma filed an objection to that application contending that Kishan Lal had not executed any such will and as such the alleged will was ineffective. As widow of the assured she claimed herself to be entitled to the amount payable under the aforesaid policies.

Evidence was led by the parties. The court of first instance, relying on a Division Bench decision of this court in Keshri Devi v. Dharma Devi, 1962 AWR 254, held that Keshav Narain was entitled to the certificate prayed for. The decisions relied upon from the other side before him were distinguished and they were Sarojini Amma v. Neel Kanta Pillai, AIR 1961 Kerala 126, Smt. Shantt Devi v. Sri Ram Lal, 1958 AWR 295, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd, AIR 1970 Calcutta 513 and Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad, 1971 AWR 785 F. B.

3. AN appeal was filed against that order by Smt. Shobha Sharma before the District Judge, Bulandshahr. Reliance was placed on behalf of the applicant on the provisions of Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the very same decisions which had been cited before the Court below. The learned District Judge was of the opinion that the decisions in all those cases were distinguishable on facts except of course the decision of Kerala High Court in Sarojini Amma's case (supra) but in view of the fact that this court had taken a contrary view in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi's case (supra) he was of the opinion that he was bound to follow that decision. He also referred to another decision of this Court in the case of Mahadeo Nath v. Meena Devi, AIR 1976 Alld. 64 but distinguished it. Thus following the decision in Keshri Devi v. Dharma Devi (supra) he confirmed the order of the trial Court. However, he felt that the Civil Judge should have directed the applicant Keshav Narain to furnish adequate security for the disputed amount before granting a succession certificate to him and he modified the Civil Judge's order to this extent that Keshav Narain was to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and that was to enure for a period of three months so that during that period Smt. Shobha Sharma might approach this Court and obtain a stay order.

4. THE present revision application has been filed against these two orders.

The submission made before me on behalf of the applicant was that the courts below erred in distinguishing the various decisions of different High Courts and the Supreme Court cited before them and that a nominee under Section 39 of the Act is only an agent for collection of money payable under an insurance policy and he does not acquire any interest in such money. It was also stated that since the parties had led evidence, it would be only in the interest of justice if their rights and title were decided in these very proceedings. On the other hand, from the side of opposite party No. 1 it was