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1982 Supreme(All) 312

High Court Of Allahabad
P. N. Bakshi, J.
Sachchidanand Pathak : Appellant
Versus
State : Respondent
Cr. Revision No. 1635 of 1980 connected with Cr. Revision No. 1906 of 1980
Decided On : Apr 01, 1982

Advocates Appeared:
N. P. Middha, P. C. Chaturvedi, P. K. Tiwari

Mere stay in hospital for 20 days is not sufficient to establish that the victim was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period, and thus does not constitute grievous hurt under Section 320(8) IPC.

Headnote:

CRIMINAL LAW - GRIEVOUS HURT - SECTION 320(8) IPC - INTERPRETATION - PROOF REQUIRED - MERE STAY IN HOSPITAL FOR 20 DAYS NOT SUFFICIENT - CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 325/149 IPC SET ASIDE - CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 324/149 IPC SUBSTITUTED.

Fact of the Case:

The accused were convicted by the trial court for offences under sections 147, 148, and 307/149 IPC. In appeal, the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction for 307/149 IPC and convicted them under 325/149 IPC. The accused challenged the conviction in revision.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the injuries caused to the victim fell within the definition of grievous hurt under Section 320(8) IPC. The Court noted that the victim's stay in the hospital for 20 days was not sufficient to establish that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period.

Issues: Whether the prosecution proved that the injuries caused to the victim fell within the definition of grievous hurt under Section 320(8) IPC.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the injuries caused to the victim fell within the definition of grievous hurt under Section 320(8) IPC. The Court noted that the victim's stay in the hospital for 20 days was not sufficient to establish that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that period. The Court relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Queen Empress v. Vasta Chela and the Gujarat High Court decision in State of Gujarat v. Samaj to support its conclusion.

Final Decision: The Court set aside the conviction for 325/149 IPC and convicted the accused under 324/149 IPC. The Court also reduced the sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone and imposed fines on the accused.

JUDGMENT

P. N. Bakshi, J.

1. THESE are two connected revisions. Criminal Revision No. 1635/1980 has been filed by Sachchidanand Pathak and 8 others. Out of these revisionists, Behari Thakur son of Bhuneshwar Thakur has since died. His revision abates. The other connected revision is Criminal Revision No. 1906 of 1980 filed by Arun Kumar. Both these revisions arise out of a conviction recorded by the trial court for offences under sections 147, 148, and 307/149 IPC and sentences of varying terms of imprisonment imposed there under. In appeal, the Sessios Judge, Allahabad has set aside the conviction of these accused-applicants for the offences under Secs.307/149 IPC, instead they have been convicted under Sec. 325/149 IPC and sentenced to 2 years' R. I., there under. The conviction of Sri Prakash Singh for the offence under Sec. 148 and the sentence of six month's R. I. imposed by the trial court has been maintained by the court of appeal. The conviction of the rest of the applicants under Sec. 147 IPC and a similar sentence of six months' R.I. has also been maintained by the lower appellate court. In these circumstances, both these revisions have been filed.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned orders. I have also minutely examined the relevant record of the case. It is not necessary for me to go into the details of the prosecution story and the defence case and to examine the evidence which has been produced by the parties and relied- upon by the courts below. The bald finding of fact, which has to be accepted in the instant case, having been concurrently recorded by both the subordinate courts, is that on the exhortation of Lallan Rai, applicant no. 8, the other accused-persons caused injuries to the victim Lallan Singh at 6.30 A. M. in the morning on 16th October, 74, at Renuccot crossing. These injuries were 26 in number, Sri Prakash was armed with a knife which was struck on the victim, but the blow was warded off by Lallan Singh with his hand, thereby causing an abrasion on the middle former surface of the right: palm. The rest of the applicants were armed with dandas and rods. There are 25 other injuries on the person of the victim in nature of lacerated wounds, bruises and swellings. These injuries have been proved in accordance with law by the production of the Doctor concerned.

Counsel for the applicant has made a number of submissions. His first submission was that the order of the appellate court is not satisfactory inasmuch as he has not dealt properly with the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and has based his findings mainly on the weakness of the defence. I have examined the submissions and have carefully gone through the impugned order, passed by the Sessions Judge. In my opinion, this criticism is not tenable. The impugned order may not be to the liking of the applicant, or may not be worded in the way he wants it to be worded, but we cannot say that prosecution evidence has not been considered independently and that the weakness of the defence is responsible for the conviction of the accused. Both the courts have concurrently considered the evidence on the record and have come to the conclusion that the offence has been satisfactorily established. I do not find any reason to interfere with these findings of fact, on the ground either of illegality or error.

3. APPLICANTS' counsel has next argued before me that the offence under Sec. 325/149 IPC has not been made out in view of the findings recorded by the Sessions Judge and the evidence on the record. In the instant case, the Sessions Judge has held the offence of Sec. 325/149 IPC proved, taking the help of clause (8) of Sec. 320 IPC. This clause runs as follows : "320 The following kinds of hurt only are designated as 'grievous.' Eighthly "any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." This













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