The court has the jurisdiction to grant the release of a portion of an accommodation for business purposes under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act XIII of 1972, even if the landlord's need is for additional accommodation.

S.D. Agarwala, J.

1. THESE are two writ petitions arising out of proceedings for release of shop No. 223-A. situate in Ganj Bazar, Meerut Cantt. The petitioner Rajendra Prasad is the owner landlord of the said premises. M/s. Shanker Dass Durga Prasad is a firm carrying on business in foodgrains and is a tenant of the said property No. 223-A which is being used as godown. Rajendra Prasad is carrying on his sweet-meat business in the adjoining shop No. 223 in Ganj Bazar, Meerut Cantt. Rajendra Prasad moved an application in the year 1970 under section 14 of the U. P. Cantonment Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1952 on the ground that he required the godown No. 223-A to expand his restaurant and to shift his Bhatti and storage there. During the pendency of this petition, U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was enacted. The application was, therefore converted as an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The application was initially dismissed by the prescribed Authority on 9th June, 1975. An appeal was filed against the said decision. The appellate court affirmed the order of the prescribed Authority. The appellate order was challenged by Rajendra Prasad by means of writ petition no. 403-A of 1976 in this court. Hon'ble M. P. Saxena, J. by judgment dated 18-2-1978 allowed the writ petition and set aside the appellate order and thereafter remanded the case for decision afresh, in the light of the observations made by him in the judgment. After remand the appellate court by his judgment dated 28th August, 1979 allowed the appeal in part of Rajendra Prasad and released the accommodation to the extent of T x 18 feet. Against the decision dated 28th August, 1979 the landlord Rajendra Prasad has filed writ petition No. 9160 of 1979 while the tenant M/s Shanker Dass Durga Prasad has filed writ Petition No. 7581 of 1979. Since both these petitions arise out of the same judgment and common questions of fact and law are involved I am deciding both these petitions by a common judgment.

2. LEARNED counsel for the tenant has urged that the lower appellate court has not considered the material evidence on record before arriving at a finding that the tenant had bonafide need for additional accommodation and an such the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court is vitiated in law. Learned counsel for the landlord on the other hand contended that once the lower appellate court found that the need of the landlord was there for additional accommodation, the entire godown No. 223-A should have been released in favour of the landlord and the order directing release of only a part of the accommodation is an order vitiated in law.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties in opposition to these contentions.

4. IN so far as the first contention is concerned, the Commissioner submitted a report. Sri B.S. Bhatnagar the Commissioner inspected the premises in question as well as other accommodation. The report of the Commissioner dated 21-12-1978 is attached as Annexure 'V to the writ petition No. 9160 of 1979. The appellate court also made a personal inspection on 3rd July, 1979. This report has also been attached as Annexure 'IV' to the writ petition No. 9160 of 1970. After examining the Commissioner's report as well as after local inspection, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that need of the landlord is there for additional accommodation. This according to the appellate court is a bonafide need of the landlord. It cannot, therefore, be said that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the need of the landlord is there for additional accommodation is based on material not no record. IN my opinion, there is no illegality in the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the landlord has bonafide need for additional accommodation. IN the circumstance, so far as the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant is c