1988 Supreme(All) 527
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S.K. DHAON, B.L.YADAV, JJ.
Miss Usha Hamilton - Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. – Respondent
Civil Misc. Writ No. 20829 of 1987
Decided on: Oct 31, 1988
B.D.Mandhyan
The definition of "family" in Rule 4(b) of the U.P. School and College Teachers Gratuity Fund was exhaustive and did not include the petitioner no. 1, who was the daughter of a married sister.
Headnote:
UP SCHOOL AND COLLEGE TEACHERS GRATUITY FUND - RULE 4(B) - FAMILY - INTERPRETATION - NOMINATION - VALIDITY - PAYMENT OF GRATUITY - CONDITIONS.
Fact of the Case:
A teacher, Miss A. S. Elias, nominated the petitioner no. 1, her sister's daughter, to receive her gratuity upon her retirement. However, the Deputy Director of Education declined to make the payment, arguing that the nomination was invalid as the petitioner did not fall within the category of family members specified in Rule 4(b) of the U.P. School and College Teachers Gratuity Fund (the Rules).
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the definition of "family" in Rule 4(b) was exhaustive and did not include the petitioner no. 1, who was the daughter of a married sister. Therefore, the nomination made in her favor was invalid.
Issues: 1. Whether the definition of "family" in Rule 4(b) of the Rules was exhaustive or inclusive? 2. Whether the petitioner no. 1, being the daughter of a married sister, fell within the category of family members entitled to receive gratuity under the Rules? 3. Whether the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 was applicable to the case of Miss Elias?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the definition of "family" in Rule 4(b) as exhaustive, based on the use of the word "include" and the absence of the word "means". 2. The court held that the petitioner no. 1, being the daughter of a married sister, did not fall within the category of family members entitled to receive gratuity under the Rules, as the definition of "family" was exhaustive. 3. The court found that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 was not applicable to the case of Miss Elias, as it applied only to commercial and industrial establishments, and the College where she worked was not such an establishment.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed summarily, as neither the petitioner no. 1 nor the petitioner no. 2, who claimed to be the sister of Miss Elias, were entitled to receive the gratuity.
S. K. Dhaon, J.
1. The averments are these. One late Miss A. S. Elias was a teacher in Jagat Taran Girls Inter College, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the College). She was to retire from service on 28th July, 1983. Since she was retiring in the mid-session, under a Government order dated 15th May, 1978, she was allowed to continue till the end of the academic session, viz., 30th June, 1984. She died on 28th August, 1988. For the purpose of the payment of the gratuity she nominated the petitioner no. 1, who was the daughter of her sister, in the prescribed form. The nomination paper was duly accepted by the College. Upon the 'death of Miss Elias, the petitioner applied for the payment of the gratuity to her. The papers were forwarded to the Deputy Director of Education by the College. By a communication dated 8th January, 1987, the Manager of the College informed the petitioner that the Deputy Director of Education by his order dated 15th December, 1986, had declined to make the payment of the gratuity payable to Miss Elias to the petitioner. The decision of the Deputy Director is being impugned in the present petition.
2. The Deputy Director refused the payment of the gratuity to the petitioner on the ground that the nomination made by Miss Elias in favour of the petitioner was invalid as she did not fall in the category of the members of the family as incorporated in Rule 4 (b) of the U.P. School and College Teachers Gratuity Fund (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). This view of the Deputy Director has been assailed before us.
An application had been made by one Mrs. A. H. Hamilttan, who claims herself to be the sister of Miss Elias, for being impleaded as the petitioner no. 2 in this petition. This application had been allowed by us. The submission is that in any view of the matter, Mrs. Hamilttan would be entitled to receive the payment of gratuity.
3. Under Rule 4 (b) of the Rules "family" includes the following relatives wholly dependent upon a teacher :- (i) Wife in the case of male teacher ; (ii) Husband in the case of a female teacher ; (iii) Sons including step and adopted children ; (iv) Unmarried and widowed daughters'; (v) Brothers below the age of 18 years and unmarried and widowed sisters (such step brothers and step sisters) ; (vi) Father ; (vii) Mother ; (viii) Married daughters (including step daughters); and (ix) Children of a pre-deceased son. Rule 6 provides that a teacher covered by the Rules, shall on completion of three years' continuous services make a nomination conferring on one or more members of his family, the right to receive any gratuity that may be admissible under the Rules. The nomination may be made in one of the attached forms as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. There is a note to the effect that if the teacher has not left any family, no gratuity will be payable under these rules.
4. A perusal of the list of the relatives included in " family " will immediately show that neither the petitioner no. 1 nor the petitioner no. 2 are included in the list. Only unmarried and widowed sisters are mentioned therein. If a married sister has been excluded, by necessary implication the daughter of the married sister stands excluded. Admittedly, the petitioner no. 1 is the daughter of the petitioner no. 2 who admittedly a married lady. If the petitioner no. 1, who is the daughter of married sister, is not a relative within the meaning of definition of "family ", the nomination made in her favour by Miss Elias was of no avail as the same could be made only in favour of one or more members of the "family ".
The question is 5 whether the definition of "family" as contained in Rule 4 (b) is exhaustive ? The definition, on the face of it, is an inclusive one. Therefore, normally it should be given an extensive meaning. The argument is that if the Rule making authority intended to make the definition restrictive and exhaustive, there was no difficulty in it using the norm