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1989 Supreme(All) 392
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
M.P. SINGH, J.
U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Deputy Director Of Consolidation - Respondent
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12233 of 1986
Decided on : Jul 28, 1989
A.K. Yog, S.A. Gilani
The consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of a lease deed executed by the Land Management Committee, and trespassers cannot acquire Sirdari rights in land belonging to the Gaon Sabha.
Headnote:
LAND REFORMS - CONSOLIDATION OF HOLDINGS - LEASE DEED EXECUTED BY LAND MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE - VALIDITY - JURISDICTION - ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR - CONSOLIDATION AUTHORITIES - NO JURISDICTION.
Fact of the Case:
A dispute arose over the validity of a lease deed executed by the Land Management Committee in favor of Dewa Ram, father of respondent no. 2, for certain plots of land. The petitioner, claiming possession of the land, filed objections under section 9-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, asserting Sirdari rights. The Consolidation Officer allowed the petitioner's objections, finding the lease deed collusive and illegal. However, on appeal, the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision filed by Dewa Ram, holding that the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of the lease deed.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the power to decide the validity of a lease deed executed by the Land Management Committee rests solely with the Additional Collector and that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same. The court further held that the petitioner could not claim any right over the land belonging to the Gaon Sabha on the basis of possession alone, as the recent amendment to sections 209 and 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) had retrospectively barred trespassers from acquiring Sirdari rights in such land.
Issues: 1. Whether the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of a lease deed executed by the Land Management Committee? 2. Whether the petitioner can claim Sirdari rights over the land belonging to the Gaon Sabha on the basis of possession alone?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the provisions of sections 209 and 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, as amended by U.P. Act No. 35 of 1976, which retrospectively barred trespassers from acquiring Sirdari rights in land belonging to the Gaon Sabha. 2. The court also relied on the Full Bench decision in Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha, Uskar, Ghazipur, which held that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the validity of a lease or allotment made by the Land Management Committee or the Collector.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner, upholding the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation.
M.P. Singh
1. The power to decide the validity of a lease deed executed by Land Management Committee always rests with the Additional Collector. The consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same.
2. In brief the facts are that the Land Management Committee executed a lease deed in favour of Dewa Ram, father of contesting respondent no. 2, on 16-4-1966. The possession of the land in dispute was also delivered to him. After the death of Dewa Ram, his son respondent no. 2 came in possession and still continues.
The plots are :- Old number New number 1366 1077 1367 1064 1368 1367
After the notification under section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was published in the official Gazette, C. H. Form no. 5 was issued in which the possession of the petitioner mill was shown The petitioner filed an objection under section 9-A of the Act claiming Sirdari rights on the basis of the possession.
3. Dewa Ram, father of respondent no. 2, also filed objections claiming sirdari rights on the basis of the lease deed executed by the Land Management Committee on 16-4-1966.
4. A large number of other objections were also filed but they are no more relevant. The only contest now is between the petitioner and the respondent no. 2.
The Consolidation Officer vide his order dated 19-4-1969 allowed the objections of the petitioner giving the benefit of section 7 (aa) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951). The remaining objections were rejected, including that of Dewa Ram. While doing so the Consolidation Officer recorded a clear finding that the lease deed executed in favour of Dewa Ram was collusive and illegal. The possession of Dewa Ram was also disbelieved. The effect of the order of the Consolidation Officer was that the lease deed executed in favour of Dewa Ram was deemed to have been cancelled.
5. Against the said order Dewa Ram filed an appeal which was dismissed on 25-11-1969. This order was challenged by him in revision. It was dismissed on 9-9-1970 for non-compliance of Rule 111 of the Rules framed under the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
6. Dewa Ram challenged the said order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6165 of 1970 which was allowed by Mr. Justice N. D. Ojha, as he then was, on 1-11-1973 and the case was remanded to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for a fresh decision While doing so it was held that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has committed manifest error of law in deciding the revision on a technical ground. When the entire record was before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, he had no jurisdiction to dismiss the revision on this technical ground.
After remand, the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision on 31-3-1975 filed by Dewa Ram, father of respondent no. 2. Against that order the present writ petition has been filed.
7. It will be relevant to point out here that initially proceedings were initiated under section 198 (2) of U. P. Act 1 of 1951 for cancellation of the lease deed executed in favour of Dewa Ram. Notices were issued to him but subsequently they were withdrawn. Against this an appeal was filed before the Additional Commissioner, Meerut which was also dismissed. Thus the said lease deed in favour of Dewa Ram could not be cancelled till this date and is still a good lease deed. The final position as it emerges is that the land initially belonged to Gaon Sabha but in the year 1966 a lease deed had been executed by the Land Management Committee in favour of Dewa Ram who continued in possession and after his death, his son respondent no. 2 came in possession. This lease has not been cancelled as yet.
8. The case of the petitioner was based on the ground of possession only. Now the question is whether the petitioner can claim any right over the land belonging to the Gaon Sabha on the basis of the possession.
In order to d
