The initiation of proceedings under Section 145 CrPC and the attachment of land under Section 146(1) CrPC did not violate the stay orders passed by the court in the writ petition, as the stay orders did not restrain the learned Magistrate from initiating proceedings under Section 145 CrPC and the attachment order was custodia legis.

G.P. Mathur

1. This is an application under sections 2 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for initiating proceedings against the respondents for having committed contempt of the orders passed by this Court on various dates. The petition was heard alongwith record of writ petition no. 14090 of 1986,

2. It appears that one Khem Karan was Bhumidhar of certain agricultural land situate in village Bara Khurd, pargana Hasangarh Tehsil Iglas, district Aligarh, Khem Karan died heirless and several persons filed objections before the Consolidation Officer claiming the property of Khem Karan deceased. The petitioners also filed objections on the ground that prior to his death Khem Karan had executed a will on 2-1-1981 by which, he had bequeathed his entire property to the petitioners. It may be mentioned here that the will is unregistered. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objections filed the petitioners and also other three set of claimants. It was held that Khem Karan died leaving no heirs and as such, the property has been vested in Gaon Sabha, The petitioners also filed appeal which was dismissed by the consolidation authority. Thereafter, the petitioners filed revision under section 48 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings, Act, but the same was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 5-7-1986. The concurrent finding is that the petitioners have failed to establish the will and that Khem Karan died heirless. Thereafter, the petitioners filed writ petition no. 14090 of i986 In this court challenging the judgments of the consolidation authorities. In the writ petition, initially followiag interion order was passed on 3-9-1986. "Issue notice. Till 18-9-86, the parties shall maintain status-quo". subsequently on 5-8-1988, the following interim order was passed : "Issue notice. If the petitioners have not been dispossessed as yet, after 2-12-86, they shall not be evicted until further orders of this Court."

It may be mentioned here that the writ petition has not been admitted as yet.

3. It appears that on 15-1-1991, Gaon Sabha through its pradhan moved an application before the S.D.M. Iglas, Aligarh stating that the persons mentioned as opposite parties to the application were trying to take forcible possession over the agricultural land which originally belonged to Khem Karan. Due to this some group had been formed in the village and disputes were taking place frequently. It was further stated that there was serious apprehension of breach of peace and it was possible that some murders may also take place. IT was prayed that necessary steps may be taken for maintaing peace and for protecting the interest of Gaon Sabha. In this application, three petitioners and 7 others were impleaded as opposite parties. The learned Magistrate called for a report from the local police station on the application moved by Gaon Sabha. The police of police station Iglas, Aligarh submitted a report on 5-2-91 saying that there was serious apprehension of breach of peace with regard to the agricultural land IT has further reported that proceedings under section 145 CrPC may be drawn. Being satisfied with the police report that there was apprehension of breach of peace, the learned Magistrate passed preliminary order under section 145 CrPC on 11-2-1991 directing the parties to appear in his court and submit written statement with regard to their claim. The learned Magistrate passed another order under section 146 (1) CrPC on 15-4-1991 attaching the property in dispute. The present contempt petition has been filed on the ground that by initiation of proceedings under section 145 CrPC and attachment of land under section 146 (1) CrPC the petitioners have been dispossessed and thus the stay orders passed by this court in the writ petition have been violated.

4. The life of the first order dated 3-9-86 which directed the parties to maintain status quo only upto 18-9-86. It is not the case of the petitioners that the said order was ex