The Industrial Disputes Act is a welfare statute and must receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions.

1. By means of this writ petition, the Award dated 19. 12. 1984 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gorakhpur has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground of its being perverse.

2. Sri Sudhir Chandra Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the workman was employed on 1. 6. 1975 in the muster roll as daily wage and continued to be a muster roll worker on daily wage with intervention from time to time till 22. 7. 1978 when his services were terminated. The workmen did not question or challenge the said order of termination. On the other hand he had applied for re-employment. Pursuant to such an application by a letter dated 23. 11. 1978 which is annexure 10' to the writ petition (Ext. 4), the workman was directed to be re-employed and accordingly he was re-employed in December, 1978 and he worked till 31. 1. 1979 upon such re-employment. His services were dispensed with on account of a Circular dated 17. 1. 1979 by which the muster roll daily wage workmen's services were to be dispensed with. Respondent No. 2 raised an industrial dispute on account of his termination on the ground that the said termination is illegal on account of violation of Section 6 N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly a reference was made, pursuant to which Adjudication case No. 126 of 1981 was registered before the learned Labour Court, Gorakhpur. The said dispute has ultimately ended in the impugned Award dated 19. 12. 1984 by which the workman was reinstated upon a finding that the termination of the service was bad on account of non-compliance of Section 6 N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Art ).

Sri Sudhir Chandra Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners contends first that since the engagement of the workman was terminated on 22. 7. 1978 and he was re-employed in December, 1978 pursuant to his application, therefore, the workman having accepted the termination on 22. 7. 1978 was estopped from challenging the same particularly when he had accepted re-employment and thus the period of his engagement should be granted from the date of re-employment and his earlier engagement should be ignored.

3. The second point as contended by Mr. Agrawal is that even if the earlier engagement is taken into account, the workman on actual calculations, does not appear to have worked for 240 days during the period of 12 months preceding the termination, namely, from 1st February, 1978 till 31st January, 1979. According to the record of the petitioners during the said period the workman had worked for 235 days, therefore, the finding of the Labour Court is perverse.

4. He contends next that it is the workman, who has raised the dispute and if no evidence is led, it is he who would fail and had to discharge the onus. The burden of proving the case of the workman was on the workman and by reason of the evidence led, the onus has never shifted to the petitioners since the workman was unable to discharge his burden. According to them the workman had admitted that his service was terminated on 22. 7. 1978. In his written statement he had never made his case that his services were terminated on 31. 1. 1979. Only by means of amendment the date 22. 7. 1978 was substituted after the petitioners had filed their written statements by the date of 31. 1. 1979 and 1. 2. 1979 respectively at different places. He contends further that the Labour Court has not addressed itself to all the materials placed before it particularly the oral evidence of the workman and he has not, in fact, considered the totality of the evidence and the materials before him and has come to a finding which is not based on materials and is perverse. Therefore, this court is competent to interfere even with the finding of fact on account of its perversity. On these grounds he has assailed the impugned Award.

Mr. Shyam Narain, learned counsel for the workman, on the other hand, contends that the petitioner had nev