The bona fide need of a landlord for premises under Section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Act (13 of 1972) must be determined by considering all the relevant factors, including the landlord's efforts to find alternative accommodation and the hardship that the tenant would suffer if the premises were released.

S. R. Singh, J.

1. Cynosure of attention in the instant case is the premises bearing Municipal No. 7/142, situate at Subhash Road Aligarh for the release of which Smt. Sarla Gupta, widow of late Daya Shanker Gupta and Sri Sanjai Gupta, son of late Sri Daya Shanker Gupta, instituted proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act (13 of 1972). The need of an unemployed youth namely, Sanjai Gupta, one of the landlords, who had passed his M. A. examination in the year 1986 and having failed to settled himself in some employment or the other, turned to find his niche in the cloth business, proposed to be set up in the shop in question, forms the basis of the application for release of the premises. The prospect of his getting married in no distant future, was assigned as the reason lending urgency to his need for release of the premises in order to enable him to set up his cloth business. The premises in question was alleged to the most ideal one for the cloth business. The need in the circumstances was touted to be the most bona fide, genuine and pressing one. The applicants, as would transpire from the record, proffered an undertaking swearing not to let out the shop in question in the event of the same being released in their favour. They also signified their willingness to recompense the tenant-petitioner in the event of his vacating the premises in dispute. The application was resisted by the petitioner inter-alia on the grounds that the need of the landlord was far-fetched and detracted from being genuine and bona fide and that he would be poised for greater hardship in the event of the premises being released. It was also added for emphasis that earlier also release applications were filed but they were discountenanced by the prescribed Authority, The third release application, culminating in the filing of the present petition was, according to the petitioner, riled on a rebound, for refusal of the petitioner to agree to enhancement in the rent proposed by the Landlords. Originally, the Landlords, Daya Shanker Gupta, was in service and that Sanjai Gupta was wanting in training and requisite experience to run the cloth venture, according to the allegations made in the objections filed on behalf of the petitioner before the prescribed Authority. In the conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the materials on record, the prescribed Authority vide its judgment and order dated 28-7-1992, tipped the scale of justice in favour of the respondent-landlord with directions to the respondents to recompense the petitioner- tenant by paying two years' rent. The appeal preferred against the judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority, being recipient of the fate of rejection, vide judgment and order dated 19-1-93, the tenant- petitioner filed the instant petition, who, however, died during the pendency of the writ petition and is represented by his Legal Representatives-Bharat Kumar Gupta and others, substituted by court's order dated 25-11-1993.

2. I have heard Sri Sanjai Kumar Singh for the petitioner and also Sri K. M. Dayal, appearing for the respondent-landlord.

The Counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently urged at the bar that the authorities under the Act, have allowed the release application sans proper-self-directions to the relevant factors enumerated in Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act and without proper consideration of the materials placed on record. Bona fide need within the meaning of Clause (a), sub-section (1) of Section 21, it cannot be gainsaid, is contingent upon variety of facts and are to be discerned in accordance with the guiding principles enumerated in sub-rule (2) of the Rule 16 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business. It brooks no dispute that an order of release or refusal to release, as the case may be, could not be given the veneer of a valid order under Section 21 (1) (a), if it results from want of proper-self- dire