The exceptional nature of appointing a receiver, the requirement for a prima facie case and evidence of potential loss of the property, and the absence of mismanagement or misappropriation were central to the court's decision.

The plaintiffs/appellants filed a suit for partition and for accountancy alleg­ing that the plaintiffs had a half share in the suit property. It is alleged that the plaintiff's husband and the defendants were co-owners and that in the suit property, a hotel under the name of Hill Way and a school under the name of North Point was running. Further there were various tenants in various portions of the prop­erty which were fetching rent. It is alleged that the defendants were not giving the share of the rent and income to the plaintiffs and consequently, the suit was instituted.

2. Along with the suit the plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. for grant of a temporary injunc­tion. The plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an appointment of a receiver.

3. Both the applications were resisted by the defendants admitting that the property was ancestral in nature and that the plaintiff's hus­band had made an oral gift, gifting the land and building to the defendants. This oral gift was subsequently reduced in writing on 1st March, 1991. The defendants further con­tended that the hotel was being run by the de­fendants, who had constructed the same from his own funds and that the school was being run by a registered society. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief.

4. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, found that a prima facie case was made out by the plaintiffs. The trial Court found that the hotel was running since 1982 and the school was running since 1986, and at that point of time, the property was joint and at that stage no oral gift, if any had been executed in favour of the defendants. The trial Court, consequently allowed the injunc­tion application and restrained the defendants from alienating the property during the pen­dency of the suit. The trial Court, however, found that the plaintiffs were not entitled for an appointment of a receiver and consequently, rejected the said application. The plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the rejection of the appli­cation for an appointment of a receiver, has filed the present appeal under Order 43 Rule l(s) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. Heard Mr. Kanwaljit Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T. S. Bindra the learned counsel for the respondents.

6. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appel­lants submitted that the defendants had taken advantage of the absence of the plaintiffs and her husband, who were residing in Sweden and were, therefore, unable to look after the property and that the defendants have illegally manufactured an oral gift, which cannot be taken into consideration and in any case could not be relied upon since the said oral gift was not registered, and which was compulsorily required to be registered under the Registra­tion Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the deci­sion of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and others reported in AIR 1960 SC 1368 and in the case of Kumar Gonsusab and others and Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban and others reported in 2008 (73) ALR 496 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1254). The learned counsel submitted that the Court be­low found that a prima facie case was made out and found that the property was an ances­tral property in which a hotel and a school was being run and that the property was let out to the various tenants. The learned coun­sel submitted that the trial Court in order to protect the property should have appointed a receiver. The learned counsel submitted that it was just and convenient that the trial Court should have appointed a receiver and had com­mitted an error in rejecting the application. Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff is a widow and is in dire need of funds. It was further contended that the property being an­cestral, no part of income was being given by the defendants and

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