Back
2010 Supreme(All) 3971
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Shabihul Hasnain, J.
Chintamani Singh -Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. -Respondent
Service Single No. 7736 of 2010
Decided On : 10-11-2010
Sri Vinod Kumar Singh, Advocate, for Petitioner.
CSC and Sri S.B. Pandey, Advocate, for Respondent.
A purposive method of interpretation should be applied to statutory provisions, and a divorced daughter, if dependent upon her father, should be included in the definition of 'family' under the Dying in Harness Rules.
Headnote:
Dying in Harness Rules - Appointment - 1974 Rules - [Dying in Harness Rules, 1974] - [32 FLR 523, 2001 All LJ 2156, 2006 (6) ALJ (DOC) 226] - The court interpreted the Dying in Harness Rules and emphasized a purposive method of interpretation over a literal one. It held that a divorced daughter, if dependent upon her father, should be included in the definition of 'family' under the rules. The court set aside the State Government's order and directed it to reconsider the petitioner's case in light of the judgments and the definition of the 'family clause' in the 1974 Rules, if the petitioner is otherwise eligible under the rules.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner's mother, a regular employee, died in harness, and the petitioner, her divorcee daughter, applied for appointment under Dying in Harness Rules. The State Government rejected the case on the ground that the divorcee daughter is not included in the definition of 'family'.
Finding of the Court:
The court set aside the State Government's order and directed it to reconsider the petitioner's case in light of the judgments and the definition of the 'family clause' in the 1974 Rules, if the petitioner is otherwise eligible under the rules.
Issues: Interpretation of Dying in Harness Rules, definition of 'family' under the rules, and the eligibility of a divorcee daughter for appointment under the rules.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized a purposive method of interpretation over a literal one and held that a divorced daughter, if dependent upon her father, should be included in the definition of 'family' under the rules.
Final Decision: The court set aside the State Government's order and directed it to reconsider the petitioner's case in light of the judgments and the definition of the 'family clause' in the 1974 Rules, if the petitioner is otherwise eligible under the rules.
Heard Sri Vinod Kumar Singh learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S.B. Pandey and the learned Standing Counsel.
2. At the very outset the petitioner has stated that due to inadvertence he has failed to array 'U.P. Hindi Sansthan' as a party in the array of opposite parties. He prays that he may be permitted to add 'U.P. Hindi Sansthan' in proper format as opposite party No. 3 during the course of the day.
3. This is an innocuous prayer. It is not opposed, hence allowed.
4. U.P. Hindi Sansthan' may be arrayed as opposite party No. 3.
5. This is a case of appointment under Dying in Harness Rules. Mother of the petitioner Smt. Shobhawati Singh was a regular employee of the respondent department and she was working on the post of 'Peon' since 26.7.1985 and she died in harness on 22.9.2007, leaving behind her divorcee daughter i.e. the petitioner and the children. The petitioner applied for appointment under Dying in Harness Rules on 15.10.2007. She submitted the requisite papers and vide Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition her case was recommended to the State Government by the Director on 2.7.2008. The petitioner says that the Director was himself the appointing authority and there was no requirement for him to have sent the matter before the State Government.
6. The State Government rejected the case of the petitioner vide its order dated 9.8.2010 on the ground that the divorcee daughter is not included in the definition of 'family'. Dying in Harness Rules has been interpreted by this court on number of occasions. He has placed reliance on a case decided by the Division Bench of this court reported in 1999 (32) FLR 523 (State of U.P. and others v. Rajendra Kumar and others). In paragraph 11 of the judgment their Lordships have held as follows:
"11. It may also be mentioned that the modern method of interpretation, as pointed out by Lord Denning in his Book : 'The Discipline of Law', is purposive and not literal. The literal method of interpretation as pointed out by Lord Denning is out of vogue everywhere in the world Supreme Court in several decisions e.g. in Hindustan Lever Ltd. V. Ashok Vishnu Kate and others : (AIR 1996 SC 285). In Administrator Municipal Corporation v. Dattatray : (AIR 1992 SC 1846) the Supreme Court observed. "The mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with the modern positive approach. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act".
7. This view found favour in another judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 26684/2001 decided on 23.7.2001 : (2001 All LJ 2156) by Hon'ble Justice A.K. Yog in the case of Kusum Devi v. State of U.P. & others. In paragraph 10 of this judgment His Lordship has held:
"A divorced daughter, if dependent upon her father, cannot be excluded and has to be included within the meaning of the word 'family' since such a 'divorced daughter', if dependent upon her father, has to be treated at par with an unmanned daughter or widowed daughter as all of them continue to to be the liability of their father as member of the family of their 'father'."
8. One more case law which has been cited is 2006 (2) UPLBEC 1972 : (2006 (6) ALJ (DOC) 226 (All)) in the matter of Sanyogita Rai v. State of U.P. & others.
9. It appears that the State Government rejected the case of the petitioner on the literal interpretation of the 1974 Rules. It will be proper that the matter may be sent back to the State Government for consideration of the case of the petitioner in the light of the judgments mentioned above.
10. At this juncture Sri S.B. Pandey appearing for the U.P. Hindi Sansthan made a prayer that he may be granted time to file counter affidavit on behalf of the opposite parties No. 2 and 3. The prayer has been opposed by the counsel for the petitioner on the ground that since the matter has already been favourably recommended by the opposite party No. 2. hence grant of time
