The court emphasized that the termination order can be upheld if the charges against the petitioner are found to be serious and justified, despite technical errors, and that the court is not inclined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rajeev Gupta for the respondent.

2. This petition is directed against a termination order dated 23.6.2005 passed by the District Judge, Etah.

3. The petitioner was working as a Senior Administrative Officer in the Judgeship at Etah at the relevant time when certain complaints were received against him, upon which the Administrative Judge, finding the complaints to be serious, directed a vigilance enquiry. Upon a vigilance enquiry, prima facie, the acts attributed to the petitioner were found to be correct whereupon a departmental enquiry was initiated. After due enquiry, the services of the petitioner have been dispensed with by the impugned order.

4. It is firstly urged that the learned District Judge while passing the impugned termination order has taken into account the allegations of sexual harassment attributed to the petitioner though it was not a charge for which the enquiry was held and therefore, it is contended, that the order is vitiated. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a learned single Judge's decision of this Court rendered in the case of Masi Uddin u. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573, and the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and others, 2001 (6) SCC 260.

5. Apparently, eight charges were framed against the petitioner on various counts, which is evident from the enquiry report and the dismissal order, some of them related to harassment of employees, including by demanding illegal gratification for getting undue favours etc. During the course of enquiry, evidence came on record about sexual harassment of lady employees also, which has merely been noted in the dismissal order, but the order is not based upon it and the District Judge himself has noted that there was no charge of sexual harassment. Mere noting of the evidence found during enquiry, without further demonstrating that the order is based upon it, would not vitiate the dismissal order. However, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate or convince the Court on this aspect. None of the two decisions cited are applicable to the present issue either on facts or on law. Thus, the argument merits rejection.

6. Lastly, it is urged that the Enquiry Officer erred in law in rejecting an application for summoning the erstwhile District Judge as a witness to support his defence and as such sufficient opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner. It is also urged that the erstwhile District Judge had submitted an affidavit in favour of the petitioner which was produced but has not been considered by either of the authorities and thus, also the punishment order is vitiated.

7. The enquiry officer has considered the merits of the application for summoning the District Judge and by an exhaustive order dated 6.9.2003 has rejected it which remains unchallenged. However, it is apparent that the enquiry officer, while rejecting the application, apart from other findings, has found that most of the charges were based upon documentary evidence and the charges with respect to demand of money was to be proved by oral evidence of the employees of the judgeship. It has also found that the petitioner had listed and examined as many as 18 defence witnesses but the name of the District Judge, who had since retired, was not mentioned in the list. The reasons given by the enquiry officer in rejecting the application appear to be fully justified and the argument cannot be accepted.

8. So far as the affidavit is concerned, it is apparent from the record that it was an afterthought and filed after submission of the enquiry report. The enquiry report was submitted on 21.5.2003 and the alleged affidavit is also dated 21.5.2003. Therefore, there was no occasion for the enquiry officer to have considered the said affidavit. Nevertheless, the District Judge while issuing show cause notice and proposing termination vide his ord