Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi, J.;—

Heard learned counsel for all the parties and gone through the records.

2. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 1.11.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Faizabad in first appeal no.124 of 2009, by which judgment and decree dated 7.8.2009 passed by learned VIth Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Faizabad in civil suit no.194 of 1986 has been confirmed.

3. This appeal has been preferred with delay of eight months and ten days. Through C.M. Application No.90982 of 2012, the appellants have prayed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act on the ground that the appellant has contacted his counsel Sri A.N. Singh, Advocate on 15.01.2012 and again on 18.01.2012. But, thereafter, on 20.09.2012 he came to know that his counsel Sri A.N. Singh has passed away on 07.09.2012. The settled legal position is that each days' delay has to be explained. The appellants have not explained any reason whatsoever falling between 18.01.2012 and 07.09.2012 to contact his counsel. In the meantime, as deposed in the counter affidavit the appellant appeared in the execution case no.1 of 2012. He moved adjournment application on 29.09.2012 which is contained as Annexure No.1, in which it was alleged that he has received copies of judgment and decree on 28.09.2012 and he has to go to contact his counsel at Lucknow and on this ground he sought adjournment. It was further alleged that in that application that Durga Prasad was doing pairavi of the case who has not filed any appeal before the High Court. This annexure falsifies the averment made by the appellant in his affidavit and, as such the delay has not at all been explained.

4. In view of this factual position the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act (C.M. Application No.90982 of 2012) deserves to be dismissed.

5. However, in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of U.P. and others v. Harish Chandra and others, (1996) 3 UPLBEC 1808, I have considered the question of condonation of delay from the perspective that the appeal deserves merit or not. This appeal arisen out of concurrent findings of both the two courts below. The plaintiffs/respondents have filed suit for mandatory and permanent injunction on the ground he is in continuous possession of plot no.786 (old no.431) and defendants are interfering in his possession without any right or title. The suit has been rightly decreed by the learned Trial Court and the appeal has also been rightly dismissed.

6. A detailed hearing and perusal of the judgment and orders of both the Courts below made it abundantly clear that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Even appreciation of evidence by the two Courts below has not been assailed before this Court.

7. In Sir Chunnilal V. Mehta & & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C., 1314, the Hon'ble Apex Court for the purposes of determining the issue has held :

"The proper test for determining whether a question of law raises in the case is substantial, would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties."

8. Further in Rajeshwari Vs. Puran Indoria, reported in (2005) 7 S.C.C., 60, it was held :

"The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine-quanon for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence."

9. In Smt. Bibhabati Devi Vs. Ramendra Narayan Roy & amp; Ors., reported in A.I.R. 1947 PC 19, it has been held :

"the Privy Council has provided the g

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