2014 Supreme(All) 1345
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : NAHEED ARA MOONIS, J.
ABDUL WAHAB .....Applicant
Versus
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS .....Opposite Parties
(Criminal Misc. Application No. 11423 of 2010, decided on 31st July, 2014)
Counsel :
Nasiruzzaman, Lav Srivastava, M.I. Siddiqui, V.M. Zaidi and S.M.G. Asghar for the Applicant; A.G.A., A.K. Srivastava, I.B. Yadav, Raj Kumar Ojha, V.P. Srivastava and Rajesh Kumar Sharma for the Opposite Parties.
Headnote:Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 319, 300 and 398—(Indian) Penal Code, 1860—Sections 498-A and 304-B—Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961—Section 3/4—Additional accused—Application for—Refusal of—What is stage at which power under Section 319 can be exercised—Whether word “evidence” used in Section 319 in comprehensive sense—Proceeding under Section 319 against person summoned is to commence from the stage of taking cognizance, Court not required to make a rouing enquiry at the stage of 319—Cognizance can be taken on basis of papers filed by police after completion of evidence—Court need not to wait the stage of cross-examination—What is nature of satisfaction to invoke power under Section 319—Degree of satisfaction for original accused and fresh accused has to be different—What is extent of power under Section 319—It extends to person not named in FIR or named in FIR, but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged—However, in case of discharge requirement of Sections 300 and 398 have to be complied with before person can be summoned a fresh—No legal impediment to summon if evidence is sufficient—By looking into evidence adduced by witnesses showing complicity of accused persons. [Paras 11 and 12]
Result; Application Allowed.
Hon’ble Naheed Ara Moonis, J.—Heard Sri V.M. Zaidi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri S.M.G.Asghar learned counsel for the applicants, Sri V.P.Srivastava, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri R.K.Sharma, for the opposite parties No. 2 to 7 and learned A.G.A. for the State and have been taken through the record.
The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the complainant against the order dated 25.3.2010 passed the learned Additional Sessions Judge Court No. 3, Ghaziabad passed in S.T. No. 1973 of 2009 (State v. Zahid) under Sections 498A/304B IPC read with Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act Police Station Massoori District Ghaziabad whereby the application moved by the complainant-applicant under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been rejected.
2. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 raised preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has contended that the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C against the rejection of the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. by the trial Court cannot be entertained as the applicant has surpassed the appropriate remedy of revision.
3. In rebuttal of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 2 to 7, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in re Municipal corporation of wherein the provision in Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been dealt with in Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others, AIR 1983 SC 67, extenso holding that Section 482 Cr.P.C. confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass order ex debito justitiae in case where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been serious abused. It is not merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the orders passed by the subordinate Courts. The scope, ambit and range of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is quite different from the powers conferred under the provision of Section 397 Cr.P.C. therefore, the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shall be available to a person despite he has remedy of revision before the Sessions Judge or High Court. The jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only to prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. In the instant case impugned order clearly denotes a situation which is an abuse of process of the Court, therefore, for the purpose of securing ends of justice it will not be a bar to exercise inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4. Further the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 was controverted by the learned counsel for the applicant that the accused respondents have no locus at this stage to object the order passed by the trial Court. In rebuttal of the same, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 submitted that the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were the persons aggrieved with the order passed on the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. therefore, they had locus to raise objection with regard to the same.
5. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the marriage of his daughter Asma alias Gudia was performed with Zahid, the son of the opposite party No. 2 in accordance with Muslim Customs and Rites about five years earlier to the said occurrence. The applicant had given sufficient dowry at the time of marriage according to his status. The family members of her in-laws including the husband were not satisfied with the dowry given at the time of marriage. They were torturing and tormenting the victim to fetch additional dowry including a Santro Car. The applicant could not fulfill additional dowry demanded by the opposite parties. In a shrouding circumstances the daughter of the applicant-complainant was burnt alive by them. Information with respect to the said occurrence was given by the sister of the deceased who was married with the younger brother