By the Court.—The petitioner is the guarantor and father of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 who took a cash credit limit of rupees seventy five lacs in a partnership firm known as S.R. Tractors in 2012 in which they were the partners. The petitioner stood guarantee for the cash credit limit by depositing the title deeds of his residential house No. 5/298A, Lohia Nagar Banna Devi, G.T. Road, Aligarh. It transpires that the accounts of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 became NPA on 31.5.2014 pursuant to which a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) dated 2.6.2014 was issued demanding a sum of Rs. 44.92 lacs. Thereafter, symbolic possession under Section 13(4) was also taken on 29.8.2014. It further transpires that the respondent bank filed an application dated 30.10.2014 before the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act praying for actual physical delivery of possession. On this application, the Additional District Magistrate (F&R), respondent No. 3 issued an order dated 4.3.2015 for delivery of physical possession pursuant to which the Additional City Magistrate, respondent No. 5 issued an order dated 21.4.2015 fixing 6.5.2015 for taking physical possession. The petitioner being aggrieved by the application of the respondents under Section 14 of the Act filed an application under Section 17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The Tribunal by an order dated 1.5.2015 rejected the stay application relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Reconstruction Company Ltd. and others, 2014 (6) SCC 1, on the ground that the order under Section 14 of the Act cannot be challenged on an application under Section 17 of the Act. The petitioner being aggrieved has filed the present writ petition.

2. We have heard Sri Sudhanshu Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Tarun Verma for the respondent bank.

3. Since there is no factual controversy and only a legal point has to be decided, we are proceeding to dispose of the writ petition at the admission stage itself without calling for a counter-affidavit.

4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the District Magistrate alone can decide the application under Section 14 of the Act and that there is no power to delegate it to any subordinate officer. The second ground urged is that the application of the bank under Section 14 of the Act is required to be accompanied by an affidavit which is mandatory and which has not been done in the instant case. It was urged that non filing of the affidavit was fatal to the disposal of the application under Section 14 and such application without being accompanied by an affidavit could not be allowed.

5. Sri Tarun Verma, learned counsel for the bank, on instructions received to him, submitted that the District Magistrate has full authority and power to delegate his power to any subordinate officer under the Act and the mere fact that the application was not accompanied by an affidavit, was not fatal to the disposal of the application since all the ingredients required in the affidavit were present and existing in the application. Learned counsel submitted that non filing of an affidavit at best could be termed as an irregularity curable and which was not fatal to the disposal of the application under Section 14 of the Act.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we find that Section 14 (1) gives power to the District Magistrate or to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of the secured assets. Section 14 (1A) provides that the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate may authorize any officer subordinate to him to take possession of such assets and document relating thereto and to forward such assets and documents to secured creditor. This sub-section (1A) t