2015 Supreme(All) 422
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : KRISHNA MURARI AND PRATYUSH KUMAR, JJ.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .....Appellants
Versus
M/s. SANKALP ASSOCIATES, KANPUR .....Respondent
(First Appeal From Order No. 1211 of 2013, decided on 29th April, 2015)
Counsel :
A.K. Gaur for the Appellants; Sanjay Singh for the Respondents.
Headnote:Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 34—Limitation Act, 1963—Section 14—Arbitral award—Passed by sole arbitrator—Benefit of Section 14—Appeal filed beyond time by 64 days—Benefit of Section 14 liable to be extended only, in case, the appellant had been prosecuting the proceeding before wrong forum with due diligence, which was not in the present case—Appellant presented the matter in Court which had no jurisdiction and that too beyond limitation, could not be said to be a case of good faith—Court below rightly rejected the application as time barred—Appellant held, not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act, 1963. [Paras 14 to 20]
Result; Appeal Dismissed.
Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—By means of this FAFO, the appellants have challenged the judgment and order dated 7.3.2013 passed by the District Judge, Allahabad rejecting the application filed by them under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the Act) for setting aside the arbitral award dated 28.3.2008 passed by the sole arbitrator.
2. We have heard Shri A.K. Gaur, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Sanjay Singh appearing for the respondents.
3. Facts, in short, relevant for the purpose of the case, are as follows.
4. An agreement dated 15.2.1996 was executed between the parties, whereunder work of annual civil engineering repairs and maintenance and small works was allotted in favour of the respondents. There was a dispute between the parties and the respondents made an application under Section 11 (5) of the Act before this Court. In the said proceedings, an arbitrator was appointed. The Arbitrator made an arbitral award, which was published on 28.3.2008. The appellants herein challenged the award by filing FAFO (D) No. 1370 of 2008 before this Court. The said appeal was presented beyond time by 64 days and was accompanied by a delay condonation application. Notices were issued on the delay condonation application.
5. In the meantime, the award was put to execution by filing Execution Case No. 7 of 2009. It is alleged by the appellants that when Shri Rajendra Singh was appointed as a counsel in the said case, he vide letter dated 14.7.2009 informed that the appeal filed against the award is not maintainable and the appellants were required to file an objection/application under Section 34 of the Act before the District Judge. Thereafter, the appellants vide letter dated 11.11.2009 requested Shri Rajendra Singh to file application under Section 34 of the Act.
6. Although the exact date has not been disclosed anywhere in the pleadings made by the appellants, however, it appears that an application under Section 34 of the Act was filed sometimes in December 2009 along with an application seeking condonation of delay read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The respondents filed objection against the maintainability of the application/objection on the allegation that it was barred by time. The District Judge vide order dated 7.3.2013 rejected the application/objection being barred by time.
7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that they are entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for pursuing the proceedings in wrong Court, which was subsequently withdrawn on 11.1.2010. It is further submitted that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary Irrigation Department and others, JT 2008 (6) SC 22, the appellants are entitled to be extended the benefit of Section 14.
8. In reply, it has been submitted that the benefit of Section 14 is liable to be extended only, in case, the appellants have been prosecuting the proceedings before the wrong forum with due diligence, which is not so in the case in hand. The earlier FAFO which is alleged to have been wrongly filed before this Court itself was barred by time and, thus, it cannot be said that the appellants were prosecuting the proceedings with due diligence.
9. In the case of M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, by a majority, has held as under.
“10. A bare reading of sub-section (3) of Section 34 read with the proviso makes it abundantly clear that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 will have to be made within three months. The period can further be extended, on sufficient cause being shown, by another period of 30 days but not thereafter. It means that as far as application for setting aside the award is concerned, the period of limitation prescribed is three months which can be extended by anot