ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
BEFORE : A.P. SAHI AND VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, JJ.
BUNDELKHAND UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS .....Petitioners
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ....Respondents
(Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49337 of 2014, decided on 15th September, 2014)
Counsel :
Anil Kumar Bajpai for the Petitioners; A.S.G.I. for the Respondents.
Headnote:Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971—Eviction—Unauthorised occupancy—Land acquired and handed over to the petitioner-University—Petitioner nowhere raised any construction—Neither encroacher nor unauthorised occupier—Dispute as to ownership—The petitioner-University was in occupation of any land that belongs to the respondent—Army authorities or not was a question of fact—The jurisdiction would depend upon any such findings—The matter to be decided while assuming jurisdiction under the Act—The Estate Officer directed to take notice of such objections and decide first the issue of jurisdiction and then dispose of the matter in accordance with law. [Paras 6 to 9]
Result; Order Accordingly.
By the Court.—Heard Sri Anil Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Gyan Prakash, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 alongwith Sri Ravi Prakash Srivastava and Sri Mohd. Isha Khan, who has accepted notice for respondent No. 4.
2. The proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “PP Act”) have been challenged by the petitioner-University contending that the provisions of the PP Act does not apply and the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer is completely excluded keeping in view the nature of the occupancy which is admittedly not unauthorised.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the land was acquired and handed over to the University and the petitioner-University has nowhere raised any constructions or occupied any land beyond the area that was acquired and given to the University. The petitioner-University is, therefore, neither an encroacher nor an unauthorised occupier so as to fall within the definition of the the PP Act. Even otherwise, the petitioner-University is a public statutory body and the respondents cannot raise the dispute under the PP Act for the purpose of eviction of the petitioner-University from the land in dispute.
4. Sri Bajpai, learned counsel for the petitioner, has relied on the Apex Court judgment in the case of Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and another v. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu and others, 2003 (8) SCC 134 and the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mrs. Nisha v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 2000 Delhi 439, to substantiate his submissions.
5. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and we find that so far as the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court is concerned, the same was by a private person in relation to a bank and there it has been held that since the Rent Control Act applies, therefore, the PP Act would not be applicable. In the circumstances, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment does not get attracted on the facts of the present case. Sri Bajpai, on the other hand, submits that the definition of the “unauthorised occupants” has been clearly elucidated which excludes the petitioner-University from such definition and, therefore, the entire proceedings are without jurisdiction. The said definition may have to be considered on the peculiar facts of this case separately to resolve the issue of jurisdiction. It is in this background that he pleads that a writ of prohibition be issued for the said purpose.
6. Relying upon paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case of Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a writ of prohibition would be available on the facts of the present case. To appreciate the said argument paragraph 14 is extracted hereinunder :
14. On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior Court or tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern the exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial discipline of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used “as a cloak of an appeal in disguise”. Lax use of such a power would impair the dignity and integrity of the subordinate Court and could also lead to chaotic consequ