Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.—This petition as originally drafted under Article 226 of the Constitution is for quashing of the order passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Stamp Reporter refused to accept the petition on the ground that a petition under Article 226 would not be maintainable, and the petitioner can only file a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is further pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that he personally went to the Stamp Reporter and requested him to accept the petition, as framed, inasmuch as, there is no legal embargo in maintaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the order of a tribunal.

2. He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, (2015) 5 SCC 423, wherein, according to him, the legal embargo in maintaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, is in respect of orders passed by the Civil Courts and not in respect of the order passed by a tribunal. He points out that Stamp Reporter refused to accept the petition and therefore, he was compelled to change the provision of law under which, the petition is being filed from that under Article 226 to Article 227 of the Constitution.

3. He further submitted that the petitioner is still seeking a writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus, as the petition is directed against the order of Permanent Lok Adalat, which is acting as a tribunal and not a Civil Court.

4. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner appears to have force. In the case of Radhey Shyam (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the reference made to it by a two judge bench, expressing doubts about correctness of the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675, in so far as it held that interference with the judicial orders of Civil Courts is permissible by issuing a writ of certiorari. In paragraph 27 of the referring order, reliance was placed on paragraph 63 of the Constitutional Bench judgment of 9 judges in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1. Paragraph 27 of the referring order is extracted herein below :

“It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or Court which are not Civil Courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by Civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above.” (emphasis supplied)

5. Thus, while referring the matter to a Larger Bench, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, drew a distinction between the orders passed by the inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction and the order of inferior tribunals or Courts, which are not Civil Courts. Thus, the reference to the larger bench was confined only to the consideration of the question regarding scope of a writ of certiorari in relation to the orders of Civil Courts and not those of inferior tribunals.

6. The Supreme Court while answering the reference held that the orders of the Civil Courts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the said dictum of law, as noted above, is confined only to judicial orders of Civil Courts and not those of the tribunals, which as noted above, stand on a different footing. This is also clear from the following observations made by the Supreme Court while answering, the reference :

“... All Courts in the jurisd