By the Court.—Heard Sri N.P. Singh, Advocate, for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for State-respondent and Sri Shivam Yadav, Advocate, for New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “NOIDA”).

2. Petitioners, by means of this writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, have assailed acquisition proceedings commenced with Notification dated 28.1.1994 issued under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1894”) and dated 10.11.1995 issued under Section 6(1) of Act, 1894.

3. It is contended that Notification under Section 6 was issued after expiry of more than one year and hence it was barred by Section 6, first proviso, Clause (ii) which provides that no Notification under Section 6 shall be issued after one year from the date of Notification under Section 4(1) of Act, 1894.

4. Sri Shivam Yadav, learned counsel appearing for NOIDA, however pointed out that petitioners are subsequent purchasers of disputed land which was acquired by aforesaid Notifications.

5. The dispute relates to the land which is part of Khasra No. 16 in village Sadarpur, Tehsil Dadari, District Gautambudh Nagar. The aforesaid khasra number 16 has a total area of 25-8-0 whereof petitioners purchased some part from erstwhile owner vide sale-deeds dated 31.12.1998 and 26.4.1999, i.e. after the proceedings for acquisition were already commenced.

6. It is pointed out by Sri Shivam Yadav, Advocate, that possession of acquired land was taken on 28.6.1999 and 29.6.1999 and petitioners being subsequent purchasers, can claim compensation only but have no right to challenge acquisition proceedings. Reliance is placed on Apex Court’s decision in Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others, 2008 (9) SCC 177, wherein Court has held that a subsequent purchaser cannot be permitted to challenge acquisition proceedings which has not been challenged by erstwhile owner, who owned the land at the time of acquisition.

7. Learned counsel for petitioners did not dispute that land in question, which was subject-matter of acquisition in a Notification under Section 4 issued on 28.1.1994 and Notification under Section 6 on 10.11.1995 was subsequently purchased by petitioners vide sale-deeds dated 31.12.1998 and 26.4.1999 but submits that transaction of sale having been completed before possession could be taken by respondents, it cannot be said that petitioners cannot challenge acquisition inasmuch land would vest in State only when possession would have been taken but in the present case, it was purchased by respondents before possession could be taken by Collector and land would have vested in State.

8. The first question need be considered by this Court, which, if answered in favour of respondents, may go to the root of the matter, is “whether petitioners, who are subsequent purchasers can challenge acquisition proceedings after a declaration is made under Section 6 of Act, 1894 but before possession is taken by Collector”.

9. This question came to be considered before Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd., 1996 (3) SCC 124, where it observed in para 3 of judgment, as under:

“3. ... It is well-settled law that after the notification under Section 4(1) is published in the gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property.”

10. In Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., 1996 (7) SCC 426, the Court said:

“5. .....It is settled law that any person who purchases land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her own peril. The object of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to enter upon the land to do prelimi