2016 Supreme(All) 1246
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
(Lucknow Bench)
BEFORE : ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
ANIL KUMAR ....Appellant
Versus
Smt. KEWLA DEVI AND OTHERS ....Respondents
(First Appeal From Order No. 749 of 2015, decided on 7th October, 2016)
Counsel :
R.P. Verma for the Appellant; Vikas Verma for the Respondents.
Headnote:Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 166, 140 and 163-A—Motor Accident—Claim petition—Necessary parties—Held, owner of the offending vehicle in a claim of motor accident is necessary party—And in his absence, such a claim cannot be tried in summary proceedings—Only exception to this rule is a ‘hit and run’ case filed under Section 161 of the Act. [Para 7]
Result; Appeal Allowed.
Hon’ble Attau Rahman Masoodi, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, questions the validity of the judgement passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in MACP No. 58/2002 allowing a compensation of Rs. 1,70,000/- against the appellant.
3. On the very opening of the arguments by learned counsel for the appellant, the question that crops up is as to who are the necessary parties in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The claim petitions under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are instituted in relation to an accident where the ownership of offending vehicle is traceable to some person upon whom the liability arising ouf of an accident is fixed after adjudication. As per the provisions of Section 168 of the Act the liability can be fixed against the owner of the offending vehicle, insurance company or the driver. In a situation where the ownership of offending vehicle is untraceable, the claim is instituted under Section 161 of Motor Vehicles Act which is classified as a ‘’hit and run’ case. The forum for adjudication of a claim under Section 166 is the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal whereas hit and run cases are adjudicated under the Solatium Scheme, 1989 promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act No. 59 of 1988).
4. Insofar as the case at hand is concerned, the proceedings were instituted under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 wherein the owner of the vehicle was not impleaded as a respondent. A perusal of the claim petition also reveals that even the number of the offending vehicle was not mentioned in the claim petition. The insurance company in absence of the particulars of offending vehicle being traceable, was also not impleaded as a respondent.
5. The facts reveal that the claim has been instituted merely on the basis of a charge-sheet being submitted by the police authorities against the driver. The charge-sheet submitted against the driver also does not disclose any details of the offending vehicle in terms of its registration number or any other identity. The claim petition filed before the Tribunal was contested by the claimants on production of the evidence of one eye-witness who is said to be an eye-witness of the accident and it is deposed by the said witness that he had seen the appellant driving the vehicle i.e. motorcycle but the details thereof remained unnoticed/unknown to the witness. The statement made by the only eye-witness shows that he had seen the appellant driving a motorcycle that hit the deceased and the motorcycle belonged to some of the relatives of the appellant. All these facts do not clearly establish the identity of the offending vehicle conclusively. Nevertheless, the claim petition was allowed and an award of Rs. 1,70,000/- has been awarded in favour of the claimants-opposite parties liability whereof has been fastened on the appellant-driver.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant while questioning the validity of the award impugned has argued that the learned Tribunal in the instant case has proceeded against the very norms and procedure prescribed under the Act for the reason that such a proceedings could not be carried out without impleadment of necessary parties. Learned counsel, in order to substantiate his point has drawn attention of this Court to Section 140 as well as Section 163-A of the Act which for ready reference are reproduced below:
“140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.—
(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the p