2016 Supreme(All) 1781
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
PRATYUSH KUMAR, J.
TEJ SINGH - Revisionist
Versus
STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER - Opposite Parties
(Criminal Revision No. 2995 of 2016, decided on 3rd October, 2016)
Counsel :
Raghuraj Kishore for the Revisionist; A.G.A. for the Opposite Parties.
Headnote:Discharge application—Rejection—Only provisions, which throws some light, is contained in Section 40 of Evidence Act, but provisions contained in Section 40, Evidence Act would amount to bar trial of second suit or trial—It would have no application as rule of estoppel, which only prevents a party from making representation contrary to what he had represented earlier—Law cited by revisionist relates to rule of estoppel and provisions contained in Section 40, Evidence Act can be invoked only when it would have effect of creating a bar for second trial, which is not case in present matter—Except Section 40, Evidence Act, there is no provision which may help case of revisionist—Hence, revision is misconceived and dismissed at this stage in limine.
Revision Dismissed.
Pratyush Kumar, J.
1. By the instant revision accused-revisionist assails correctness of order dated 22.7.2016 passed by the A.C.J.M. IInd Saharanpur in Criminal Case No. 1432/2015 (Jagdish vs. Prem Singh) whereby application for discharge moved by the revisionist was rejected.
2. Heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
3. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the dispute is essentially of civil nature. In reference to the property in question revisionist filed a Suit No. 192 of 1984 against Jagdish for specific performance of contract before the Civil Court. O.P. No. 2 filed his written statement and took the defence as stated in the present complaint. The suit was decreed and findings were recorded contrary to what was stated by O.P. No. 2 in his complaint.
4. He has further submitted that this Court in the case of Raunaq vs. State of U.P. 1987 Cri. L.J. 445 when confronted with similar controversy, in para 9 and 10 of the report observed the following:-
"9. It was held in Sarnam Singh vs. State 1967 All Cr R 423 that, it would be highly detrimental to the administration of justice and would shake the confidence of the public in the same if a categorical finding recorded in favour of the accused on a point in an earlier case is allowed to be set at naught on the same point in a subsequent case which was an offshoot of the previous case. If this were allowed there would be two contradictory findings in regard to the same matter, which cannot but have a very detrimental effect on the administration of justice.
10. In Manipur Administration, Manipur vs. Thokechom Bira Singh, 1965 (1) Cri LJ 120 (SC), it was observed that the rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel of res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of Section 403(2). I respectfully agree with the said observations."
5. He further submitted that Hon'ble Apex Court in Manipur Administration, Manipur vs. Thokchom Bira Singh, 1965 (1) Cri. LJ 120 (SC) has observed that though under the provisions contained in Section 403, Cr.P.C. only second trial is barred for the same offence, but the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in such cases rule of issue estoppel would be applicable and observed the following:-
"The rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of S. 403(2)."
6. The question to be determined is what would be the effect of judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 192/1984, Prem Singh vs. Jagdish Chandra whereby suit for specific performance of contract filed by Prem Singh son of the present applicant was decreed.
7. This question bears little relevance here because in the original suit accused-applicant was not party. He cannot take any benefit of the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 192/1984.
8. So far as averments contained in para 3 of the complaint are concerned, on 5.3.1984 according to O.P. No. 2 when he was taking jewellery with his son, he was ambushed by five miscreants. They looted one wrist watch, jewellery and Rs. 35/-. When they narrated