The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act 2005 allows for the grant of interim maintenance to both the aggrieved person and her children, emphasizing the wide amplitude of the provisions for passing interim orders.

Rajan Roy, J.

Heard.

The criminal revision No. 419 of 2015 has been converted into an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the order of this court dated 9.6.2016.

2. The applicant herein who is the husband has challenged the appellate order dated 15.6.2015 passed under Section 29 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act 2005 (hereinafter referred as 'Act') by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge (Court No. 5) Raebareli and the original order dated 19.2.2015 passed under Section 23 read with Section 20 of the Act by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Raebareli granting interim maintenance.

3. Contention of learned counsel for the applicant herein is that the application for interim maintenance purported to have been moved under Section 20(4) of the Act was not maintainable as under the provisions of the said Act there was no provision for grant of interim maintenance. Further contention was that in the complaint under Section 12 it is only the wife who was the complainant and not the children, therefore, no relief could have been claimed for the children by way of interim maintenance. It is further contended that both the children were major, as was evident from parivar register and also from the age mentioned in the application for interim maintenance, as such, they were not entitled to interim maintenance, as, such maintenance, assuming it to be admissible, can only be granted to an aggrieved person or her child. Child is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act to mean 'any person below the age of eighteen years and includes any adopted, step or foster child'. In view of the facts narrated by the respondent herself before the court below no interim maintenance could have been ordered to the children. Even if it could be considering the fact as asserted by the respondent herein that they were minors, such claim could only have been entertained through the aggrieved person which was not the case herein.

4. On the quantum of maintenance awarded the applicant has relied upon various documents including the Tehsildar's certificate showing the monthly income as Rs. 1916/- per month. The information provided to him under the Right to Information Act 2005 as contained in Annexure-6 to the application mentioning that the applicant did not own any property in his name in the area as alleged nor any shops which in fact were in the name of his mother. It was further contended that the respondent-wife was in fact running a beauty parlour. In this context the court was informed that an affidavit of a landlady of the building wherein the said beauty parlour was being run was filed before the court below, but, the same has not been appreciated. Attention of the court was invited to an alleged receipt of licence-fee issued by the Zila Panchayat Raebareli in respect to the beauty parlour alleged to be run by the respondent, photocopy of which is annexed as Annexure-1.

5. It was contended that the appellate court has only been persuaded by report of the Protection Officer and the fact that the applicant did not rebut his report. It is also contended that earlier a brik kiln was being run by his brother, but considering the attempt of the respondent with the aid of her brother to usurp the same which was a proprietorship concern, the same was closed and was not functioning any more. He invited attention of the court to certain documents relating to the Trade Tax Department to show that such attempt on the part of the respondent along with her brother to usurp the brick-kiln was turned down and their application was rejected.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the applicant had himself stated before the Protection Officer that he along with his brother had been running a brick-kiln. As regards the age of the children the learned counsel for the respondents candidly admits that one of the child namely Km. Ashmita Singh was above 18 years old when the impugned orders were passed. The mark-shee