Hon’ble Manoj Misra, J.—Heard counsel for the petitioner; and Sri B.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Manoj Kumar Sharma for the contesting respondent No. 1.

2. Sri B.P. Singh does not pray for time to file counter-affidavit. Therefore, considering the nature of the order that is being passed as also ground on which it is being passed this Court does not find it necessary to issue notice to the second respondent, accordingly, with the consent of the learned counsel for the represented parties, this petition is being disposed of finally.

3. Brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows:

An Original Suit No. 204 of 1990 was instituted by Smt. Usha Devi (Respondent No. 1) against N. B. Montrose (Respondent No. 2) and Sanjay Khandooja (Petitioner) for specific performance of agreement for sale evidenced by agreement dated 28.3.1984 and sale-deed dated 17th January, 1985. Another suit No. 212 of 1989 was instituted by Smt Usha Devi against as many as seven defendants including Sanjay Khandooja (Petitioner). Suit No. 212 of 1989 was for permanent prohibitory injunction in respect of a portion of immovable property which was the subject-matter of sale-deed dated 17.1.1985. In the pending suit No. 204 of 1990, an application was filed by the plaintiff-respondent for consolidation of suit No. 204 of 1990 and 212 of 1989 on the ground that both the suits were pending in the same Court and since in original suit No. 204 of 1990, the subject-matter of the agreement was the same as in respect of which injunction was sought in original suit No. 212 of 1989, therefore both the suits be consolidated and O.S. No. 212 of 1989 be made the leading case.

4. The trial Court by its order dated 2.4.2013 rejected the consolidation prayer on the ground that the cause of action in both the suits was different; the parties were different; and there was no justification to consolidate the two suits. Against the order dated 2.4.2013, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed a Civil Revision No. 239 of 2013 which came to be allowed by impugned order dated 23.1.2017 thereby setting aside the order dated 2.4.2013 and remanding the matter back to the trial Court for taking a fresh decision on the consolidation application filed by the plaintiff-respondent.

5. The revisional Court took the view that for applicability of Order IV-A C.P.C. neither commonality of parties nor commonality of cause of action is essential what is of paramount consideration is whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that there be a joint trial. It observed that since O.S No. 212 of 1989 related to a portion of property of which sale-deed was executed under parent agreement dated 28.3.1984, of which enforcement was sought by O.S. No. 204 of 1990, therefore, the trial Court needed to reconsider the consolidation application.

6. Assailing the order dated 23.1.2017, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Order IV A of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer any right upon the parties to seek consolidation of two suits but it confers a discretion on the Court to consolidate two or more suits when it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that there be a joint trial. It has been submitted that the Court below has considered the facts of the case; the array of the parties; and the difference in cause of action in the two suits, to record its satisfaction that the two suits need not be consolidated and accordingly rejected the application. It has been submitted that once said discretion has been exercised by the trial Court and the application has been rejected, no right of any party stood affected and therefore the Revisional Court committed manifest error by interfering with such an order which was well within the jurisdiction of the trial Court. It has also been submitted that the Revisional Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in as much as revision itself was not maintainable in view of the pr