The central legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of strong and cogent evidence against a person to exercise the power u/s 319 Cr.P.C., emphasizing the discretionary nature of the power and the need for circumspection and reasonableness in its exercise.

Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J.: -

The present criminal revision has been filed seeking quashing of the order dated 8.10.2013 passed by learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Court no.13, Aligarh whereby an application moved u/s 319 Cr.P.C. in S.T. No. 131 of 2011 State Vs. Gagan Sharma and others u/s 498A, 302, 304B IPC and Section 3/4 D.P. Act has been rejected.

2. Heard learned counsel for the revisionist and learned AGA for the State. The entire record including impugned order has been perused.

3. The contention of the counsel is that the statements of the prosecution witnesses who have been examined to prove the factual aspects of the case clearly disclose the complicity of both the respondents, namely, Munna Lal alias Murari Lal Sharma and Ram Kumar Upadhyay respectively and it cannot be said that there was no evidence on record on the basis of which they could to have been summoned by the lower court under 319 Cr.P.C. According to the counsel it is very much within the powers of the court to summon the additional accused other than those who are facing the trial, if the evidence produced discloses certain offences having been committed by them. According to the counsel though it is a fact that the Investigating Officer after investigating the case did not find it fit to submit the charge sheet against the twin respondents but the submission of final report or the non-submission of charge sheet against them will not preclude the court from exercising its power u/s 319 Cr.P.C. According to the counsel the powers under section 319 Cr.P.C. are plenary in nature and can be exercised even against the accused whose complicity was found to be doubtful in the estimate of the investigating officer It has also been submitted that though an earlier application moved by first informant seeking the summoning of the respondents under section 319 Cr.P.C. had been rejected by the trial court and revision against the same was also dismissed by the High Court but a subsequent application moved after the production of the new witness shall be maintainable in law and the earlier rejection shall not act as a bar to summon the accused at a later stage of the trial on the basis of the new material. According to the counsel the impugned order has been passed on the second application moved by first informant after the first had already been rejected but according to the counsel, the second application was filed after P.W.2 was produced whose evidence was not available at the time of the earlier rejection. Further submission is that while deciding the application under section 319 Cr.P.C. the trial court had not much discretion to exercise and the allegations made by the witnesses ought to have been thought sufficient to summon the accused but the same has not been done. The impugned order is, therefore bad in eyes of law according to the contentions raised by the counsel.

4. Learned AGA in rebuttal has submitted that the impugned order is a reasoned order containing correct analysis of facts and law both and there is nothing wrong that may be pointed out in the impugned order and the same cannot be faulted with.

5. After hearing the rival sides and perusing the records it appears that both the applicants are distant uncle in laws (Phoopha). Respondent no.2 Munna Lal is Superintending Engineer by vocation and is said to have been posted at Varanasi, many hundred kilometers away from the place of occurrence which is situate in District Aligarh. Respondent no.3 too is a man in service. Ordinarily speaking the nature of allegations made against them is such which bristles with improbabilities. It can also be gathered from record that the facts alleged in the FIR and the evidence given by P.W.1 when taken together, is not very different from what has been deposed by P.W.2 against both the respondents. It is apparent that the evidence of P.W.2 does not very substantially make any difference or addition to the allegations which were already there again