The court discussed the limitations on the power of the court in a second appeal and the need for a substantial question of law to be of general public importance or to directly and substantially affect the rights of the parties for the court to entertain a second appeal.

Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi,J.: -

Heard learned counsel for parties and gone through judgments of both the Courts below.

2. This is a simple dispute on the basis of ownership and possession over the piece of land in the village abadi. The plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction on the basis of lease but both the Courts below have found that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the ownership and possession. This court cannot enter into the evidence as there is no perversity.

3. A detailed hearing and perusal of the judgment and orders of both the Courts below made it abundantly clear that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal.

In Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki & Ors. 2006 (4) SBR 371, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: -

4. The Privy Council, in Luchman v. Puna [(1889) 16 Calcutta 753 (P.C.)], observed that a second appeal can lie only on one or the other grounds specified in the present section.

The Privy Council, in another case Pratap Chunder v. Mohandranath [(1890) ILR 17 Calcutta 291 (P.C.)], the limitation as to the power of the court imposed by sections 100 and 101 in a second appeal ought to be attended to, and an appellant ought not to be allowed to question the finding of the first appellate court upon a matter of fact.

5. In Durga Chowdharani v. Jawahar Singh (1891) 18 Cal 23 (PC), the Privy Council held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. The clear declaration of law was made in the said judgment as early as in 1891. This judgment was followed in the case of Ramratan Shukul v. Mussumat Nandu (1892) 19 Cal 249 (252) (PC) and many others. The Court observed :

"It has now been conclusively settled that the third court...cannot entertain an appeal upon question as to the soundness of findings of fact by the second court, if there is evidence to be considered, the decision of the second court, however unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand final."

6. In the case of Ram Gopal v. Shakshaton [ (1893) ILR 20 Calcutta 93 (P.C.)], the Court emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts below.

7. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad v. Baij Nath [ (1893) ILR 15 Allahabad 367]. The Court observed that a judge to whom a memorandum of second appeal is presented for admission is entitled to consider whether any of the grounds specified in this section exist and apply to the case, and if they do not, to reject the appeal summarily.

8. Similarly, before amendment in 1976, this Court also had an occasion to examine the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and Others [ AIR 1959 SC 57 ], the High Court of Madras set aside the findings of the District Judge, Guntur, while deciding the second appeal. This Court observed that notwithstanding the clear and authoritative pronouncement of the Privy Council on the limits and the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under section 100, Civil Procedure Code, "some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under Section 100 , Civil Procedure Code. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the judgment of the High Court which had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence.

9. In M. Ramappa v. M. Bojjappa [(1963) SCR 673], the Andhra Pradesh High Court interfered with the f