The legal principle established is that waiver of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. can be presumed and implied based on the orders passed by the court, and the plea of want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. is open only to the Government and the officers mentioned in the section.

Anjani Kumar Mishra, J.

Heard Sri Triveni Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Manas Bhargava who appears for respondents 7 to 9 in the writ petition. I have also heard Sri Brij Kumar Yadav who appears for the Gaon Sabha.

2. Since, counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, with the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard and is being decided finally.

3. The petitioner, by means of this writ petition has sought quashing of the order dated 22.04.2015 passed by the Board of Revenue and the order dated 13.07.2012 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Kanpur Nagar.

4. From the record, it transpires that a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. read with Section 106 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act was served by the contesting respondents on 27.01.2012.

5. The suit under Section 220 (9)-B, where from this writ petition arises, was filed on 13.02.2012. The plaint was accompanied by a stay application as also an application for waiver, regarding the period of notice provided under Section 80 C.P.C.

6. The contention of Sri Triveni Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the suit was registered on the same day, however no stay order was granted. Neither any order was passed on the waiver application.

7. He therefore contends that in view of the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 80 C.P.C., the suit could not have been registered since there was no urgency. The plaint should have been returned. He further submits that a detailed objection on the aforesaid grounds was filed by the petitioner. This objection was dismissed by the trial court vide order dated 13.07.2012. The consequential revision filed by the petitioner has been dismissed vide order dated 22.04.2015. Hence, this writ petition.

8. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner primarily is that in view of the Order 4 Rule 1 (3) read with Section 80 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the registration of the suit without passing any order on the waiver application is patently illegal.

9. It is contended that the suit could have been preferred only after the expiry of two months from the date of notice under Section 80 and 106 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. Even otherwise this period of notice could have waived only if an order was passed on the waiver application. No such order was passed. The fact that no interim order was granted in favour of the respondents, clearly shows that there was no urgency in the matter and, therefore, the order registering the suit is illegal and the courts below have committed manifesto illegality in rejecting the objection of the petitioner.

10. The other contention raised by Sri Triveni Shankar is that the objection has been dismissed by the trial court on presumptions. He submits that there should have been a specific order on the waiver application and in the absence of any such order, it cannot be presumed that the notice under Section 80 and Section 106 of the Panchayat Raj Act stood waived, as has been held by the trial court.

11. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the question of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. is a question between the plaintiff and the State. The petitioner, who is a private defendant in the suit cannot raise any objection to the waiver of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. He further contends that no interim order was required on 13.02.2012, when the suit was preferred and registered because there was already an interim order operating in favour of the petitioner, which have been granted by the writ court. The suit itself had been filed pursuant to the directions contained in the order of the writ court. The respondents had been granted interim protection for a period of one month to enable them to file a suit by the writ Court.

12. He therefore contends that the order of the trial court is not based on presumption but is in consonance with the facts and circumstances of the case.

13. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel fo