2015 Supreme(All) 4102
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Anil Kumar, J.
Kuldeep Saxena - Appellant
Versus
Addl. District Judge, Room No.2, Lucknow & 4 Others - Respondent
Misc. Single No. 7225 of 2015
Decided On : 01-12-2015
For the Petitioner:- Prashansa Singh, Suresh Kumar Mishra, Advocates.
For the Respondent:- Deepanshu Das, Yogesh Gurnanee, Advocate.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the restriction and conditions imposed on amendments of pleadings under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, particularly after the trial has commenced, as introduced by the 2002 Amendment Act.
Headnote:
Amendment of Pleadings - Civil Procedure Code - Order 6, Rule 17 - 1999 Amendment Act - 2002 Amendment Act - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the amendment of pleadings under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, highlighting the changes brought about by the 1999 and 2002 Amendment Acts. The court emphasized the limitations and conditions imposed on amendments after the trial has commenced, as well as the historical context and purpose behind the amendments.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction, which was dismissed by the trial court. The petitioner appealed and sought to amend the plaint during the appeal. The appellate authority rejected the amendment, leading to the present case.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, added by the 2002 Amendment Act, imposes limitations on amendments after the trial has commenced. It emphasized the need for due diligence and the prevention of frivolous applications to delay trials.
Issues: The key issue was whether the amendment sought by the petitioner could be allowed after the trial had commenced, considering the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC and the 2002 Amendment Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC restricts the power of the court to allow amendments after the trial has commenced, unless due diligence is demonstrated. It emphasized the need to prevent frivolous applications and delays in trials.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the rejection of the petitioner's application for amendment, based on the limitations imposed by the 2002 Amendment Act.
Anil Kumar, J. –
Heard Ms. Prashansa Singh, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri Deepanshu Das, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record.
2. Facts in brief of the present case that the petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction registered as Regular Suit No. 21 of 2002, in the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Lucknow, dismissed by order dated 15.01.2009, challenged by the petitioner-plaintiff by filing a Civil Appeal No. 28 of 2009 (Kuldeep Saxena v. Smt. Sukhrani and others) on 20.02.1990. During the pendency of the appeal, an application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC has been moved before the appellate authority for making certain amendments in the plaint, the same has been opposed by the defendant.
3. By an order dated 28.10.2015, Additional District Judge, Room No. 2, Lucknow/respondent No. 1ppellate authority had rejected the same, the said order is under challenge in the present case.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
5. In order to decide the said controversy, it is necessary to state the following facts in brief. Order 6, Rule 17 CPC as exists before 1999 is quoted as under: -
"Order 6, Rule 17 :
"17. Amendment of pleadings - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties." The aforesaid provision was omitted by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 Section 16 of the Amendment Act reads as follows:
"16. Amendment of Order 6 - in the First Schedule, in Order 6-
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(iii) Rules 17 and 18 shall be omitted." The provision as it exists now after the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 Order 6, Rule 17
"17. Amendment of pleadings-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial."
It is seen that before the amendment of Order 6, Rule 17 by Act 46 of 1999, the Court has taken a very wide view of the power to amend the pleadings including even the plaint as could be seen from L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957 SCR 438 , SCR at 450 and Gurdial Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja, (2002) 2 SCC 445 : AIR 2002 SC 1003 .
By Act 46 of 1999, there was a sweeping amendment by which Rules 17 and 18 were wholly omitted so that an amendment itself was not permissible, although sometimes effort was made to rely on Section 148 for extension of time for any purpose.
Ultimately, to strike a balance the legislature applied its mind and reintroduced Rule 14 by Act 22 of 2002 w.e.f. 1-7-2002. It had a provision permitting amendment in the first part which said that the Court may at any stage permit amendment as described therein. But it also had a total bar introduced by a proviso which prevented any application for amendment to be allowed after the trial had commenced unless the Court came to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. It is the proviso which falls for consideration."
6. It is to be noted that the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC have been substantially amended by the CPC ( Amendment ) Act 2002.
7. Under the proviso no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless in spite of due diligence, the matter could not be raised before the commencement of trial. It is submitted, that