Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Heard Shri V.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri K.R. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents.

2. This petition calls in question an order dated 30 June 2008 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jhansi, the third respondent herein. In terms of the said order, the third respondent has proceeded to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any wages for the period 27 February 1992 upto 5 February 1997. The sole ground on which the decision of the third respondent rests is his understanding that the petitioner would stand disentitled from payment of wages for this period on account of the applicability of the principles of ‘no work no pay’.

3. In order to appreciate the challenge laid to this order, it would be relevant to note the following facts.

4. The petitioner was initially dismissed from service on 27 February 1992. He assailed this order before the Tribunal which by its judgment dated 23 December 2016, allowed the claim and set aside the order of dismissal. While doing so, however, the Tribunal granted liberty to the respondents to proceed in the matter afresh and in light of the observations appearing in its judgment. It further clarified that the payment of wages for the period during which the order of dismissal operated would abide by the fresh decision which the respondents would take pursuant to the remit by the Tribunal.

5. It is not disputed that in terms of the liberty so granted, the proceedings were drawn by the respondents afresh. These proceedings ultimately culminated in a fresh order of punishment dated 20/22 July 1999 being passed, in terms of which the petitioner was awarded the punishment of reversion to the lowest pay-scale for three years. This order was again subjected to challenge by the petitioner before the Tribunal. The Tribunal while upholding the order of punishment noted that the Disciplinary Authority had not passed any order in respect of back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. In view thereof, while allowing the appeal, it commanded the Disciplinary Authority to take a fresh decision in this respect within a period of three months. This is evident from the operative directions of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 22 October 2007 which read thus :

“In view of the aforementioned observations, the claim petition is allowed party. It is not required to interfere in the order dated 20/22.7.1999 (Annexure-1) but the punishing authority is directed to take decision about the admissibility of the consequential benefits of the petitioner in accordance with law. The punishing authority shall also pass an appropriate order regarding back wages from the date of dismissal of the petitioner from service till the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. This matter shall be decided within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”

6. It is pursuant to this direction that the impugned order has come to be passed.

7. While it is true that jurisdiction, authority and discretion does exist in a Disciplinary Authority to consider whether full emoluments are liable to be paid for the period during which an order of dismissal operated and ultimately comes to be set aside by a Court or Tribunal, the seminal issue for consideration is whether in such a situation the principles of ‘no work no pay’ can be imputed.

8. The fact that the Disciplinary Authority has the jurisdiction to consider this aspect stands duly enshrined in the relevant service rules. This position is not disputed by the parties before this Court. This leaves the Court to only consider whether the principles of ‘no work no pay’ can have any application.

9. The answer in the considered view of this Court must necessarily be in the negative and against the respondents. The principle of ‘no work no pay’ stands attracted in a situation where an employee has refused to discharge duties of his ow