The legal point established is that a claim based on adverse possession requires examination of entries made in accordance with provisions of the Land Records Manual and evidence of continuous possession for the prescribed period.

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner; learned Standing Counsel for respondent no.1 and perused the record.

2. The petitioner instituted suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act against respondents 3 to 5 on 20.03.2006 for declaration of Bhumidhari rights in respect of plot no.93 Sa, area 0.160 Hectare, on ground of adverse possession. It appears that the said respondents transferred their right in favour of second respondent (Smt. Nasreen Bano), vide sale deed dated 31.03.2006, therefore they exhibited no interest in the proceeding and the suit proceeded ex-parte and was decreed by Additional Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar, Allahabad vide order dated 23rd November, 2010. To set aside the ex-parte decree, an application was preferred by the second respondent claiming that she was necessary party, having purchased the interest of respondents 3 to 5, but was neither impleaded nor served with summons therefore ex-parte decree be set aside. Simultaneously, the second respondent filed an appeal also against the ex-parte decree. The recall application was rejected vide order dated 07.01.2011 on the ground that the same was not maintainable as already an appeal had been filed against the ex-parte judgment and decree. Thereafter, the appeal of the second respondent was dismissed summarily, vide order dated 9th March, 2011, by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad.

3. Aggrieved by dismissal of her appeal, the second respondent filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue, Allahabad which, by the impugned order dated 13th July, 2017, has been allowed and the matter has been remanded back to the trial Court with direction to decide the suit afresh after affording opportunity to both sides to lead evidence by keeping in mind the observations contained in the judgment of remand.

4. A perusal of the order passed by the Board of Revenue would reveal that it examined the merits of decision of the trial Court as well as the appellate court and concluded that as the claim of the petitioner was set up on the basis of adverse possession by placing reliance on class 9 entries there ought to be examination as to whether those entries were made in accordance with provisions of the Land Records Manual whereas there was no such examination. The second appellate court was also of the view that whenever a claim is made on the basis of adverse possession, then the matter has to be examined on the weight of evidence, oral as well as documentary, so as to ascertain whether continuous possession of 12 years has been duly proved or not. It found that from the record it did not appear that the petitioner had filed 12 years' Khasra to substantiate his continuous possession. Accordingly, it considered it appropriate to remand the matter to the trial court to decide the suit afresh after giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and by addressing all those vital aspects which are necessary to be addressed before a claim is accepted on ground of adverse possession.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order passed by the Board of Revenue on the following grounds: (a) that the second respondent was not even a party in the proceeding, therefore appeal of the second respondent was not maintainable and in any case since the second respondent had purchased the interest lis pendence, she was bound by the decree passed against the respondents 3 to 5; (b) that the Board of Revenue was not legally justified in reopening the entire suit proceeding even if the second respondent was not heard by the trial Court because the proceeding went ex-parte against its predecessor-in-interest; and (c) that the husband of the second respondent had admitted possession of the plaintiff in mutation proceeding and therefore possession was duly-proved.

6. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner.

7. In so far as first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner i